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CONDEMN (THE) NATION: HOLDING THE UNITED STATES
ACCOUNTABLE THROUGH INVERSE CONDEMNATION
CLAIMS FOR ITS ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT—AND THEN
FAILING TO MITIGATE AND ADAPT TO CERTAIN
EFFECTS OF—CLIMATE CHANGE
JOSEPH ROSENBERG†
I. INTRODUCTION
Since around 1880, the Earth has warmed more than 1.8ºF,
and scientific consensus indicates that it will warm at least another

† Thanks and affection go to Professor Joseph Singer (who offered comments on several
drafts), Benjamin Rosenberg (who also offered comments on previous drafts), Karen Shaer,
Jessica Rosenberg, Lisa Hansmann, Professor Richard Lazarus, Professor Jody Freeman, and
all those at the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal who helped edit this Article. This Article
was completed in Spring 2018 and so reflects the state of the law and the world at that time.
In most respects, developments since then have strengthened the Article’s claim. For instance,
federal environmental deregulation has continued apace, while major weather events (such as
the 2018 California wildfires) devastated private land; environmental reports (such as the
second volume of the NCA4 and an IPCC special report) have underlined the gravity of
climate change. However, one case on which I rely—Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United
States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015)—was pending on appeal last spring and has since been
reversed by the Federal Circuit, see Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2018). The reversal certainly shows how difficult it can be to convince courts of
the correctness of ambitious takings claims. But I believe the Federal Circuit’s decision is
wrong as a matter of law, and I hope that it will eventually be seen as such. This Article
examines Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t most closely in Part VI to show that governmental
inaction can form part of the basis for a taking. Despite the reversal, I believe that that is still
correct as a matter of law for the other reasons given in Part VI and on the strength of the
authorities cited therein. In addition, while the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion in Saint
Bernard Par. Gov’t has been reversed, its reasoning is still compelling, and may be accepted
in different forums; federal district courts have original jurisdiction—concurrent with the
Court of Federal Claims—over inverse condemnation claims alleging under $10,000 in
damages, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012).
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1.8ºF.1 Most of the warming to date has occurred since 1970,2 and the
pace of warming has seemed to accelerate since then: the seventeen
hottest years on record have occurred in the past eighteen years.3
Almost everyone agrees that this warming is anthropogenic—caused
by humans—through burning fossil fuels that emit greenhouse gases
(GHGs), the most important of which is carbon dioxide (CO2).4 These
GHGs warm our planet by lingering in the atmosphere and trapping
heat, just like the roof of a greenhouse. Global warming has led to
widespread, rapid changes in our climate.
Anthropogenic global warming—and thus anthropogenic
climate change—is almost universally accepted in the international
and United States’ scientific communities,5 seemingly accepted in the
United States’ legal community,6 but much less accepted in certain
1

Henry Fountain et al., 2017 Was One of the Hottest Years on Record. And That Was Without
El
Niño,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/18/climate/hottest-year-2017.html; Camila
Domonoske, So What Exactly is in the Paris Climate Accord?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 1,
2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/01/531048986/so-what-exactlyis-in-the-paris-climate-accord (noting that Paris Climate Agreement’s goal was to achieve the
best-case scenario of restricting future warming to 3.6ºF).
2
Rebecca Lindsey & LuAnn Dahlman, Climate Change: Global Temperature, NAT’L
OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (NOAA) (Aug. 1, 2018) https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature; THE ROYAL SOC’Y
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., CLIMATE CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES 2 (2014) (“Human
activities—especially the burning of fossil fuels since the start of the Industrial Revolution—
have increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations by about 40%, with more than half the
increase occurring since 1970.”).
3
See Fountain, supra note 1.
4
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN
THE UNITED STATES 14 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that the three most-abundant GHGs—in
decreasing order of volume emitted—are CO2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O)); see
also THOMAS L. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES IN A WARMING WORLD 47 (2015) (listing
studies).
5 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014
Synthesis Report (2015) (hereinafter referred to as the “IPCC 5TH SYNTHESIS REPORT”);
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1189-90 (2009) (“The longawaited, and much-debated, scientific consensus regarding climate change cause and
effect is now at hand.”).
6
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007) (documenting
the Court’s acknowledgment that “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and
well recognized,” and that there exists “a causal connection between manmade greenhouse
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sectors of the United States’ political community.7 The United States
has played an extremely prominent role in anthropogenic climate
change: it is the single largest contributor historically to the artificial
emission of GHGs. Between 1850 and 2011, the United States
contributed 27 percent of global cumulative CO2 emissions. Today,
the United States is the world’s second-largest GHG emitter, behind
China.8
The most well-documented, detrimental effects of global
warming are rising sea levels and rising average surface
temperatures.9 Scientists are confident (with varying degrees of
certainty) that global warming has led to other, more extreme climate
events too, such as heat wave, drought, and more frequent and
powerful storms.10 The brunt of climate change is borne unequally:
coastal and equatorial communities (often the most vulnerable and
least culpable populations) feel the effects most acutely.11 Many
gas emissions and global warming”).
7
For instance, Republican President Donald Trump outwardly denies that global warming
exists. See, Dylan Matthews, Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115
Times. Here’s All of It., VOX (June 1, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-climate-agreement
(compiling Trump tweets disparaging climate change as fake, a hoax, or a “canard”).
President Trump’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator does not believe
CO2 is a primary contributor to global warming. See Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts
Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html. It is
arguable that the modern Republican Party does not support the view that anthropogenic
climate change exists. See CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, US CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 34–35
(2015); GOP Deeply Divided Over Climate Change, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.people-press.org/2013/11/01/gop-deeply-divided-over-climate-change/ (finding
that while 84% of Democrats believe in climate change, only 46% of Republicans do).
8
Mengpin Ge et al., 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitters, WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explainworld%E2%80%99s-top-10-emitters.
9
IPCC 5TH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4.
10
Id. at 53 (“It is likely that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe,
Asia, and Australia.”); CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 25 (“The [USGCRP]
and the [IPCC] project that, more likely than not, tropical cyclones will become more intense
over the 21st century, with higher wind speeds and heavier rains.”).
11
Nicholas Kristof, Swallowed by the Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/opinion/sunday/climate-change-bangladesh.html;
Mike Ives, A Remote Pacific Nation, Threatened by Rising Seas, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/asia/climate-change-kiribati.html;
DAVID
ARCHER, THE LONG THAW 53 (2009) (“[N]egative impacts of climate change will be felt most
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Americans already feel the effects of climate change and many more
will: in 2010, 39 percent of the United States’ population lived in
shoreline counties, meaning they were potentially subject to floods
from sea level rise and storm surge, and might even be forced from
their homes in the future.12 If this sounds far-fetched, consider that
America already has climate change refugees: a federal relocation
program is currently underway for residents of an island off the coast
of Louisiana,13 and a Virginian island in Chesapeake Bay is not far
behind.14 Climate change is a present and pressing reality, even if its
full effects won’t be felt for decades and centuries to come.
The most logical way for the United States to address the
dangers of climate change is through the democratic process by
passing climate change legislation.15 In 2009, the 111th Congress
attempted just that, but the attempt failed the following year in the

severely in under-developed countries.”).
12
What Percentage of the American Population Lives Near the Coast?, NOAA,
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2018); see
Dominique Mosbergen, Climate Change May Force Millions of Americans to Move Inland,
HUFFPOST (May 22, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sea-level-climatemigrants-united-states_us_591a9e93e4b0809be157a253.
13
Coral Davenport and Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate
Refugees’, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettlingthe-first-american-climate-refugees.html; Tristan Baurik, Here’s Where Residents of Sinking
Isle de Jean Charles Will Relocate, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 20, 2017),
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/12/site_chosen_for_relocating_isl.html
(last updated Dec. 20, 2017); Kevin Sack and John Schwartz, Left to Louisiana’s Tides, a
Village
Fights
for
Time,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
24,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/24/us/jean-lafittefloodwaters.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=span-ab-top-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (pointing out
that on Louisiana’s coast “a football field’s worth of wetlands . . . vanishes every 100
minutes”).
14
See Jon Gertner, Should the United States Save Tangier Island From Oblivion?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/magazine/should-the-united-statessave-tangier-island-from-oblivion.html; see also GARY GRIGGS, COASTS IN CRISIS: A GLOBAL
CHALLENGE (2017).
15
Combating climate change is so difficult because polluting the atmosphere is “a classic
example [of] . . . the tragedy of the commons [in which] [i]ndividuals profit from releasing
CO2, but everyone collectively pays the price. Each individual’s incentive in such a situation
is to exploit the common resource to the maximum extent.” THE LONG THAW, supra note 11,
at 159.
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Senate.16 Since then, climate change legislation looks less and less
likely.17 As a result, some plaintiffs are taking to the courts to make
novel but plausible claims attempting to hold the United States
government accountable for its role in promoting global warming and
not adapting to its effects.18 These suits have focused, for instance, on
the public trust doctrine,19 the federal common law claim of public
nuisance,20 the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),21 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.22 A few suits have
concerned inverse condemnation claims that rely on the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.23 In fact, in the wake of Hurricane
Harvey in the fall of 2017, plaintiffs filed scores of takings claims in
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.24
16

See Evan Lehmann, Senate Abandons Climate Effort, Dealing Blow to President, N.Y.
TIMES (July 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/07/23/23climatewire-senateabandons-climate-effort-dealing-blow-88864.html?pagewanted=all.
17
Compare Lazarus, supra note 5, at 1153 (claiming in July 2009 that “[c]limate change may
soon have its ‘lawmaking moment’ in the United States”) with Nadja Popovich et al., 67
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rulesreversed.html (detailing Trump’s rollbacks of prior efforts to combat climate change).
18
See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
10, (2017) (recording that the U.S. has hosted almost three times as much climate change
litigation as all other countries combined); see also Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for
Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785 (2015) (arguing that courts should be even more proactive
about filling this gap in the democratic process).
19
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (foundation of public trust doctrine);
Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224 (D. Oregon 2016) (holding that the public trust
doctrine can apply to the federal government); but see PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S.
576, 603 (2012) (“[T]he public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.”).
20
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d American Elec.
Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (finding, although later reversed, that
the Clean Air Act did not displace federal common law claim of public nuisance).
21
Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 449–52 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that
discretionary function exception immunized Army Corps of Engineers in this instance), cert.
denied, Lattimore v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013).
22
Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1250 (“[T]he right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”); cf. In re Maui Elec. Co., No.
SCWC-15-0000640 (Haw. Dec. 14, 2017) (finding that Hawaiian citizen-plaintiffs had
asserted a “protectable property interest in a clean and healthful environment”).
23
Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015).
24
The Flood of Takings Cases After Hurricane Harvey, TAKINGS LITIGATION (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://takingslitigation.com/2017/10/23/the-flood-of-takings-cases-after-hurricane-harvey/
(focusing on the ACE’s decisions regarding controlled flooding in Harvey’s aftermath).
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Plaintiffs enjoy certain advantages in bringing an inverse
condemnation claim rather than, say, a tort case under the FTCA.
First, the government has waived sovereign immunity under the
Tucker Act for claims based on the Constitution,25 whereas the FTCA
contains only a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.26 Consider two
cases following Hurricane Katrina that attempted to hold the United
States liable for its role in constructing a canal that it failed to maintain
and which thus exacerbated the Hurricane’s effects. While the FTCA
case was dismissed under the discretionary function exception,27 the
Fifth Amendment takings case initially succeeded.28 One further
advantage is that the United States is generally exempt from flood
liability stemming from federal flood control projects,29 but it is not
exempt from claims originating in the Constitution.30
This paper will examine the merits of a particular kind of
inverse condemnation claim. Thus, it will not address questions of
“nonjusticiability,” like standing and political question doctrine.
However, a short word: while these issues may be thorny,31 they are
unlikely to present a stumbling block—both for the three successful
scenarios contemplated by this paper infra, and for other, more
ambitious claims: plaintiffs have survived motions to dismiss on
standing and political question grounds from extremely unlikely
positions in the climate change arena. For example, petitioners in
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency satisfied standing requirements
even though they sought a very small reduction in global GHG
emissions.32 And, in Juliana v. United States, a group of young
plaintiffs sued the federal government, asserting an implied
25

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012) (announcing the FTCA’s discretionary function exception).
27
See Katrina, 696 F.3d at 449.
28
Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 746, rev’d 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
29
Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012) (“No liability of any kind shall attach
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any
place.”)
30
§ 1491(a)(1).
31
JACQUELINE PEEL AND HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY
PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 272 (2015) (discussing such issues).
32
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–26 (“A reduction in domestic emissions would slow
the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”).
26
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fundamental right to a stable climate; the case was not dismissed as a
nonjusticiable political question.33
As yet, no plaintiff has brought a successful inverse
condemnation suit against the United States where the federal
government’s liability stems from its dual role in bringing about
climate change through encouraging and incentivizing GHG-emitting
activities and in failing to mitigate and adapt to particular climate
change effects that the United States was under a duty to address. But
both precedent and legal theory suggest that some such claims could,
in fact, succeed.34
As the primary regulator of the fossil fuel industry, the federal
government has inspired the most GHG emissions of any country in
history. At the same time, the United States government has not done
nearly enough to mitigate emissions or adapt to their effects even
when under constitutional and statutory duties to do so and when it
knew or should have known of the significant risk of serious harms
posed by those effects. Still, the federal government is hardly the only
party responsible for climate change: globally, most GHGs were
emitted outside the United States, private companies actually emitted
most GHGs within the United States, and extreme weather did not
begin in 1970. It is important to note the limits of the claim advanced
here: The United States cannot be liable for every climate changeinduced harm caused by rising sea level, storm surge, or wildfire.
Courts should evaluate such claims based on a five-factor test
that builds on the tests used in Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United
States35 and Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States.36 Specifically,
courts should consider: (1) protectable property interest, (2) character
of property and reasonable investment-backed expectations, (3)
33

Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1235–1242 (examining the six factors from Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962)).
34
See infra Part III (detailing three successful scenarios). Note also that even unsuccessful
claims would highlight the federal government’s inadequate response to climate change. See,
e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Hurricane Katrina Decision Highlights Liability for Decaying
Infrastructure, N.Y. L. J. (2012); PEEL, supra note 31, at 153 (“[E]ven if not successful . . .
these tort cases . . . make governments more likely to engage in proactive planning to avoid
costly litigation and reputational damage.”).
35
568 U.S. 23 (2012).
36
See Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, supra note 23.
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foreseeability, (4) causation, and (5) substantiality. Causation will
undoubtedly require the lion’s share of courts’ attention. While courts
have not clearly articulated a single causation test that satisfies the
constitutional obligation to compensate for takings,37 courts seem to
mirror the causation test from tort law—that is, some form of causein-fact and proximate cause are both necessary.
In examining cause-in-fact, courts should first determine
whether a preponderance of the evidence suggests that the underlying
cause of plaintiff’s harm was an effect of climate change. This inquiry
could be either easy or difficult depending on the underlying cause. If
the preponderance of the evidence indicates that climate change was
the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm, courts should next determine
whether the United States government’s role in promoting climate
change in addition to its failure to adapt adequately to the particular
climate change effect at issue—through either inadequate
governmental action or inaction when under a duty to act—indicates
that the federal government was a “substantial factor” of plaintiff’s
harm.
Once cause-in-fact is satisfied, the court must evaluate
whether the federal government was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s
harm. As courts have indicated, in order to ensure that the government
does not become an insurer of last resort, some element of
foreseeability is required. In the context of the claim advanced by this
paper, courts should evaluate proximate cause by determining
whether clear and convincing evidence suggests that the federal
government knew or should have known that its actions to combat
plaintiff’s harm were inadequate or that its inactions would pose a
significant risk of serious harm that did, in fact, materialize.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes
the state of the law regarding takings, with an emphasis on physical
invasions. Part III attempts to concretize the discussion that follows
and help frame the limits of the paper’s claim by describing three
scenarios that should succeed according to the takings test proposed
here and two that should fail. Parts IV–VII proceed through the steps
37

See Jan G. Laitos, The Role of Causation When Determining the Proper Defendant in a
Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1181, 1183 (2012) (“The law surrounding this
causation requirement, though commonly litigated, is unsettled and therefore uncertain.”).
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a plaintiff must take to succeed in an inverse condemnation claim
against the United States government. First, plaintiff must show
exactly what the United States government has done to promote
climate change effects such as sea level rise, increased chance of
flooding by storm surge, and more frequent wildfires due to drought
and heat wave. Thus, Part IV attempts a comprehensive recounting of
the federal government’s affirmative actions—particularly in
supporting the fossil fuel industry—that have promoted global
warming. Part V lays out a non-exhaustive list of constitutional and
statutory duties—some more specific and others more general—that
various entities of the United States government incur to combat and
adapt to particular climate change effects. Part VI explains why
governmental inaction in certain circumstances can lead to takings
liability. Part VII revisits the five-factor test suggested supra and
gives an extended treatment to foreseeability and causation.
II. THE TAKINGS TEST FOR PHYSICAL INVASIONS
The Fifth Amendment reads: “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”38 It limits the power
of the United States government to invade private property rights.
Today, takings are generally divided into two buckets: physical and
regulatory.
Takings jurisprudence initially recognized only physical
takings that arose as the result of the government’s exercising its
power of eminent domain.39 As such, two quintessential physical
takings occur when the government “directly appropriates private
property for its own use,”40 or “physically occupie[s] the property and
exclude[s] the owner.”41 Whenever the government affects a
38

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 688 (5th ed. 2017); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967) (“At one time it was commonly held that, in the absence
of explicit expropriation, a compensable ‘taking’ could occur only through physical
encroachment and occupation.”).
40
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2015).
41
SINGER supra note 39, at 688.
39
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permanent, physical occupation of private property, that occupation
is a per se physical taking.42 Regulatory takings occur when a
government regulation or statute “goes too far” by causing a “certain
magnitude” of diminution in a particular property’s value.43 In
determining whether a regulation has gone “too far,” courts typically
consider the regulation’s economic impact on the affected parcel, the
regulation’s interference with the owner’s reasonable, investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the government’s action.44
Some today believe that the distinction between physical and
regulatory takings is arbitrary.45 Still, courts employ the distinction.46
This paper focuses especially on the case of a physical taking, but the
paper’s claim may be extended to a regulatory taking analysis.
Permanent physical occupations are “the most serious form of
invasion of an owner’s property interests.”47 For example, Professor
Michelman explained:
[C]ourts . . . never deny compensation for a
physical takeover. The one incontestable case
for compensation (short of formal
expropriation) seems to occur when the
government deliberately brings it about that its
agents, or the public at large, ‘regularly’ use,
or ‘permanently’ occupy, space or a thing
which theretofore was understood to be under
private ownership. This may be true although
the invasion is practically trifling from the
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A]
permanent physical occupation . . . is a taking without regard to the public interests that it
may serve.”).
43
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922).
44
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
45
See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99,
101 (2012) (“[U]nder current takings law, a physical occupation with trivial economic
consequences gets full compensation. In contrast, major regulatory initiatives rarely require a
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”).
46
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2017) (discussing the distinction in the first
paragraph of the Court’s most recent takings case).
47
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
42
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owner’s point of view.48

One of the oldest and most well-settled examples of a physical taking
by means of physical occupation occurs when the government causes
a flood of private property. For instance, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay &
Mississippi Canal Co., the Court found a taking when the government
allowed construction of a dam that permanently flooded plaintiff’s
property with backwater, “so as to effectually destroy or impair its
usefulness.”49 The Court has often reaffirmed such an
interpretation.50 In addition, government-induced flooding need not
be permanent to constitute a taking.51 For example, in Ark. Game, the
Court found that the Corps’ repeated, temporary flooding of
plaintiff’s property took plaintiff’s property unconstitutionally.52
More generally, the government appropriates property
unconstitutionally when it either causes the property to be
uninhabitable,53 or forecloses the property’s reasonable, intended use
even if “the enjoyment and use of the land are not completely
destroyed.”54 For example, in United States v. Causby, military
airplanes regularly flew over plaintiff’s home and chicken farm at
such a low altitude that plaintiffs became fearful themselves, and
some of their chickens were also so fearful that they flew into the
walls of the outbuildings in which they were kept and killed
themselves.55 The Court held that this intrusion, while not a physical
occupation, had constituted a taking of an easement of flight on
48

Michelman, supra note 39, at 1184–85.
80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) (“It remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial
structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking.”).
50
See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
51
See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 34.
52
Id. at 26.
53
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946) (agreeing that a government
action that renders private property uninhabitable is a taking); Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (holding that irregular zoning on a small part of a large parcel
that rendered the entire parcel unsuitable for residential purposes was a taking).
54
See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 33 (noting that takings claim could succeed when government
action established “a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
55
Causby, 328 U.S. at 258–59.
49
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plaintiff’s property.56
Some of the most visible and easily foreseeable consequences
of climate change will be physical invasions of private property that
leave those properties uninhabitable. For example, sea level rise will
inundate coastal areas;57 more unpredictable and violent storms will
result in storm surges;58 and increased drought and heat wave will
induce wildfires that raze certain properties to the ground.59 Some—
but not all—of these invasions should be compensable as takings. Part
III presents three such successful claims and two unsuccessful ones.
III. RESULTING HARM – THREE SUCCESSFUL SCENARIOS AND
TWO UNSUCCESSFUL SCENARIOS
The government cannot be held liable for every flood from
sea level rise or storm surge, or every wildfire that follows extreme
drought or heat wave. However, it should be liable for some. The
federal government has contributed substantially to global GHG
emissions,60 see infra Part IV, and various federal entities bear rather
specific duties to respond to climate change effects, see infra Part V.
Thus, when a particular federal entity knew or should have known
that its actions were inadequate or its inactions would result in
significant risk of serious harm, see infra Part VII, the federal entity
may be liable for a taking. This set of claims is limited, as illustrated
by the following five scenarios. In each, plaintiff’s property has been
56

Id. at 264–65.
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 12 (2009) (“Sea-level rise and storm surge place many U.S. coastal areas at increasing
risk of erosion and flooding.”) (hereinafter “USGCRP REPORT”).
58
See id. at 89; Extreme Precipitation and Climate Change, CTR FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/extreme-precipitation-and-climate-change/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018).
59
See USGCRP REPORT, supra note 57, at 33; Heat Waves and Climate Change, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/heat-waves-and-climate-change/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
60
In fact, the U.S. military is understood to be the single largest institutional consumer of
crude oil in the world. See Arthur Neslen, Pentagon to Lose Emissions Exemption Under
Paris
Climate
Deal,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
14,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/14/pentagon-to-lose-emissionsexemption-under-paris-climate-deal.
57
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rendered physically unusable due to flood or fire, but only the first
three should lead to a successful claim.
The first successful scenario relates to sea level rise, the
climate change effect “for which the greatest levels of scientific
certainty exist.”61 Plaintiff has built a home on a coastal parcel. In so
doing, plaintiff reasonably relied on Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)-prepared flood maps and purchased the
recommended flood insurance through the FEMA-administered
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). However, sea level rise
affecting this coastal land has accelerated in the last ten years. During
this time, FEMA has neither updated the flood maps nor adjusted the
insurance. As a result, just one year after plaintiff completes
construction, the sea level at high tide approaches plaintiff’s front
door, and the front yard is unusable because it is always sopping
wet.62 During rain storms, plaintiff’s house often floods.
In this scenario, the federal government will be liable for a
taking because the five factors of this paper’s proposed test are
satisfied. Plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations were reasonable
because plaintiff relied on FEMA’s flood maps and NFIP program
when building. The federal government caused plaintiff’s harm
because it either knew or should have known—under 42 U.S.C.
4101(e), FEMA is required to reassess its flood maps every five
years—that its flood maps were outdated and so posed a significant
risk of serious harm. Finally, plaintiff’s property here is arguably
uninhabitable and, inarguably, plaintiff’s reasonable and intended use
of the land is foreclosed because of the flooding by sea level rise.
The second successful scenario relates to flooding by storm
surge from repeated storms in a place that has not traditionally
experienced such storms. For example, imagine that Hurricane Sandy
in 2012—which flooded coastal areas in New York City,63 causing
61

PEEL, supra note 31, at 155; see also CLIMATE CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES, supra
note 2, at 16 (reporting that global sea level rise in the last two decades has been about 0.12
inches per year and that the overall observed rise since 1901 is eight inches).
62
Cf. Gertner, supra note 14.
63
See Matthew Bloch et al., Surveying the Destruction Caused by Hurricane Sandy, N.Y.
TIMES http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2012/1120-sandy/survey-of-the-flooding-innew-york-after-the-hurricane.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
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tens of billions of dollars of damage64—was followed by nearly
identical storms in 2014 and 2016. Also imagine that FEMA did not
update New York City’s flood maps following any of the three events.
This is not unrealistic: FEMA is just now, in the beginning of 2018,
commencing to redraw New York City’s flood maps taking into
account the effects of Hurricane Sandy.65
After the event in 2016, a plaintiff whose property is not in a
high-risk flood zone yet was still flooded in each event—2012, 2014,
and 2016—would be able to bring a successful inverse condemnation
claim against the federal government and FEMA, in particular, for its
failure to update the flood maps (as in scenario one). Plaintiff’s
investment-backed expectations are reasonable because plaintiff still
lives in a low-risk flood zone according to FEMA. The 2016
hurricane was foreseeable to the federal government: the event
regularly recurred, and scientists and climatologists emphasized that
climate change was likely responsible due to rising Atlantic Ocean
surface temperatures. The federal government caused the extent of
the damage because it knew or should have known that its failure to
update New York City’s flood maps after multiple of the same,
recurring events would lead to significant risk of serious harm.
The third successful scenario regards a wildfire that begins on
federal land—in a region that has become increasingly plagued by
severe drought and extreme heat wave in the past twenty years66—
and spreads onto adjacent private property, which happens to be a
poor, low-income neighborhood. Multiple homes are burned to the
ground. This scenario is a present concern for some property owners
in California, and that concern will only grow as levels of drought
64

See Fast Facts: Hurricane Costs, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fastfacts/hurricane-costs.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
65
David Chen, In New York, Drawing Flood Maps Is a ‘Game of Inches’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/nyregion/new-york-city-flood-mapsfema.html.
66
Climate
Change
Indicators:
Wildfires,
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-wildfires (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that the “extent of area burned by wildfires each year appears to have
increased since the 1980s”); see also CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 11
(indicating that nine of the ten years with the largest acreage burned since 1983 have occurred
since 2000).
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increase in many places across the United States.67 The federal
entities responsible for monitoring firefighting on federal lands—the
Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, and FEMA—were fully aware of the drought and heat
conditions, and so it knew or should have known that the threat of
wildfire was high.
As a result, pursuant to its statutory duties to take firefighting
measures in these circumstances, one of those entities endeavored to
solve the problem. In accordance with scientific guidance, the federal
entity planned a controlled burn and mechanical thinning in the forest
at issue. However, a bureaucratic morass slowed the project for six
months, after which time the project simply fell through the cracks,
even though scientists and climatologists repeatedly warned that a
wildfire would strike imminently. A year or two later, the devastating
wildfire strikes. These plaintiffs would succeed against the instant
federal entity because the entity actually knew that its failure to use
appropriated funds for adequate firefighting to protect lands adjacent
to federal land would cause significant risk of serious harm.
In the first unsuccessful scenario, a category four hurricane
hits Seattle in 2019 and floods numerous properties along the
shoreline. These owners did not buy flood insurance through NFIP
because FEMA’s flood maps indicated that there was little to no flood
risk in Seattle. FEMA’s flood maps looked as they did because
hurricanes almost never strike the United States’ west coast due to
low Pacific Ocean surface temperatures,68 and, anyway, the storm
was category one until very close to shore. Neither climatologists and
scientists nor recent weather patterns suggested that Seattle was in
67

Drought and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS.,
https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-change/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018)
(displaying a graphic indicating that northern Texas and western Oklahoma have recently
experienced unusually extreme drought); Warming Climate Is Deepening California
Drought,
COLUMBIA
UNIV.:
THE
EARTH
INST.
(Aug.
20,
2015),
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/3258 (noting that rising temperatures drive
ground moisture into the air, thus making the ground better fuel for wildfires); CLIMATE
CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 8 (finding that from 2000 to 2015, 20-70% of U.S. land
area experienced abnormally dry conditions).
68
Why Do Hurricanes Hit the East Coast of the U.S. But Never The West Coast, SCI. AM.,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-do-hurricanes-hit-the-east-coast-of-the-u-sbut-never-the-west-coast/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).

100

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

danger from such a hurricane.
In this scenario, if plaintiffs along Seattle’s coastline brought
an inverse condemnation claim against FEMA for its role in
encouraging them through flood maps to build where they did, these
claims should fail. First, a preponderance of the evidence does not
suggest that climate change caused this hurricane; the hurricane did
not follow a pattern associated with climate change, it surprised
scientists, and it occurred in an area unaccustomed to such storms.
Second, and relatedly, FEMA simply did not know and should not
have known that this storm would strike when and where it did. The
federal government cannot insure all flood victims.
In the second unsuccessful scenario, recall the facts of the
third successful scenario supra. Now, though, imagine that after
planning to undertake a controlled burn and mechanical thinning,
rather than being slowed by bureaucratic morass and sidetracked by
other projects, the governmental agency actually did—in accordance
with the suggestion of climatologists and scientists—undertake a
controlled burn and mechanical thinning to make the forest less
susceptible to wildfire. Still, a wildfire strikes the following year. In
this situation, a court should inquire into the adequacy of the federal
entity’s actions. But, if they were adequate and taken in good faith,
the federal entity should not be liable because after the controlled burn
the government did not know, nor should it have known, its actions
would leave the adjacent landowners at significant risk of serious
harm; in fact, it would be reasonable for the federal government to
think the opposite: that its actions mitigated the risk of serious harm
through wildfire. Courts must not deter good faith governmental
efforts at climate change adaptation.
IV. OFFICIAL ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
THAT HAVE PROMOTED GLOBAL WARMING AND BROUGHT
ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE
Through its long history of regulating the transportation and
electricity-generation sectors, the federal government set the rules of
the game in favor of fossil fuels, the burning of which accounts for
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the lion’s share of the United States’ GHG emissions. When the
United States government began to learn about climate change in the
1970s, it continued to favor the fossil fuel industry while taking
virtually no action to address climate change.69 Almost all action
amounted to funding research rather than mitigation or adaptation.70
Only recently has the federal government made a genuine effort to
mitigate and adapt to climate change, but President Trump has
already rolled back an extraordinary number of those efforts,71 and he
will no doubt persist in his efforts.72 Section IV.A infra describes the
federal government’s policies regarding climate change as an
environmental concern, and Section IV.B infra offers an account of
the federal government’s actions in the transportation and electricitygeneration sectors.
A. The United States government’s policies on climate change
In the 1970s Congress passed the most important laws
governing pollution and our environment, such as the National

69

Note the implication: both Democrats and Republicans are at fault. Control of the White
House has been shared equally since the late 1970s, and Congress has shifted often, too.
Democrats have held both the White House and Congress for eight years and Republicans for
six (before Trump). See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 41–43.
70
While funding research is important—and continues today apace—the funds committed
are insufficient, and urgent action is required. See THE LONG THAW, supra note 11, at 20
(“[A]bout 2 billion dollars per year are being spent on climate change research, 50% of this
in the United States.” This “amounts to only about 5% of the profits from the Exxon Mobil
Oil Company.”).
71
Lisa Friedman and Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon
Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/10/09/climate/clean-power-plan.html (repealing the Clean Power Plan).
72
Trump has not succeeded in all his desires. For example, his tax bill left subsidies for
renewables largely intact. See Brad Plumer, Tax Bill Largely Preserves Incentives for Wind
and Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/12/16/climate/tax-bill-wind-solar.html. Further, FERC rejected his plans to promote coal.
See Trump Plan to Boost Coal and Nuclear Power Gets Rejected, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-plan-to-boost-coal-and-nuclear-power-getsrejected/.
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),73 the Clean Air Act (CAA),74 the
Clean Water Act (CWA),75 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).76
But these laws had mostly to do with pollution and conservation, not
climate change.77 The last significant environmental law of any kind
was the CAA Amendments of 1990. Subsequently, the executive
branch and environmental groups have attempted to retrofit old
statutes—the CAA, in particular78—to deal with climate change head
on, or more obliquely.79 The most recent attempt to pass a climate
change bill—a GHG cap-and-trade measure—failed in 2010.80
The United States government has almost certainly been
aware of anthropogenic climate change since the mid-1970s.81 In
1976, a congressional committee began conducting research on
climate change,82 and Congress passed a series of laws—including
the National Climate Program Act of 197883—in the ensuing years
that appropriated funds for such research.84 President Carter
mentioned anthropogenic climate change in a public speech in
1979.85 And in 1980, a Senate Committee held the first ever
congressional hearing devoted solely to climate change.86
73

See 43 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2012). NEPA also created the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), intended as the environmental equivalent of the Council of Economic
Advisors.
74
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2012).
75
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012).
76
16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012)
77
RICHARD L. REVESZ AND JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE
“WAR ON COAL” 116 (2016).
78
For example, President Obama’s CPP was based on little-used CAA § 111(d).
79
See, e.g., PEEL, supra note 31, at 71–78 (highlighting in particular “actions under NEPA
and the ESA”).
80
See BREWER, supra note 4, at 157–70 (detailing the journey of the Waxman-Markey Bill
as it passed the House but failed in the Senate).
81
See infra at Section VII.C for a more in-depth recitation of what the government knew and
when.
82
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 47.
83
15 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. (2012). The Act’s purpose was “to establish a national climate
program that will assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to natural and
man-induced climate processes and their implications.” 15 U.S.C. § 2902 (2012).
84
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 47.
85
Id. at 50.
86
Id. at 51.

2019]

103

While President Reagan was unfriendly to climate change
sympathizers,87 government-sponsored research continued, and
evidence of anthropogenic climate change’s dangers amassed.88 But
no action followed.89 This tension between increasing scientific
consensus and political nonchalance or intransigence—the “growing
divergence between . . . scientists and administration officials”90—
became a recurring theme. Following the 1986 midterms, Congress
instructed the EPA and State Department to develop a climate change
policy and report their findings to Congress.91 Due to the law’s
publicity and an unusually hot summer, both candidates in the 1988
presidential race referenced climate change.92 Candidate Bush
promised action.93
But President Bush walked back Candidate Bush’s
enthusiasm. The only climate change action forthcoming was
increased funding for research.94 While early signals had been good,95
87

OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., PRESIDENTS AND THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT 282 (2015)
(remarking that in his first week, Reagan halved CEQ’s staff and “ordered the removal of the
solar panels Jimmy Carter had placed on the White House roof”); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 52
(noting that Reagan repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, proposed cutting climate research
budgets.)
88
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 52–53 (explaining that an EPA report in 1983 was the “first time
a government agency had stated that climate change posed a real threat rather than a
theoretical one”).
89
Reagan and some in his administration had no interest in climate change. EPA
Administrator Anne Burford and Interior Secretary James Watt, for example, “obstructed the
implementation of laws, reduced budgets, and sided with business interests in disputes over
public lands, mining, waste disposal, and a range of other environmental issues.” See id. at
52.
90
Id. at 54.
91
Id. (describing the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987).
92
Id. at 54–56.
93
Id. at 6 (reporting that Candidate Bush said: “Those who think we are powerless to do
anything about the ‘greenhouse effect’ are forgetting about the ‘White House effect’”).
94
For example, the United States Global Change Research Act of 1990—which established
the U.S. Global Change Research Program—and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 both boosted
research into climate change and attempted “to promote development of alternative energy
sources.” See id. at 56–59. Note that the 1990 CAA Amendments were substantial, but, again,
they regarded traditional air pollution, not global warming.
95
Secretary of State James Baker in 1989 told an IPCC Working Group that the United States
“can probably not afford to wait until all of the uncertainties have been resolved before we
act.” Id. at 56–57. In addition, Bush supported carbon sinks in the form of trees and in his
first budget, “he requested $175 million to plant a billion trees per year.” Id. at 59.
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internal conflict within the Bush administration—particularly
between the EPA, which wanted to address climate change, and the
Office of Management and Budget, which did not96—stifled any
ambitious attempts. In addition, President Bush deliberately framed
climate change in linguistically uncertain terms so as to justify
inaction.97 Beginning in 1992, the United States joined the
international movement to address climate change by joining the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC).98 Still, Congress and President Bush made clear that they
opposed mandatory GHG emission limits on America.
Under President Clinton, whose vice president and several
cabinet members were environmentalists,99 the federal government
also did not meaningfully combat climate change. Rather, small steps
and expansive rhetoric were the norm.100 In 1997, the United States
signed the Kyoto Protocol, which committed developed countries to
binding emissions limits but exempted developing countries.
However, the United States was not legally bound by the Kyoto
Protocol.101 In fact, the Senate declared before negotiations began—
in a July 1997 Resolution that passed 95–0—that it would not approve
such a treaty.102
The second set of Bush years were also marked by hostility to
climate change science and “efforts to abrogate international
obligations.”103 For example, the United States withdrew from the
Kyoto Protocol officially,104 and President Bush obstructed the EPA
from publishing proof of anthropogenic climate change, such as by
urging the removal of references to “climate change” or “global
96

Id. at 57, 60.
Id. at 60–61.
98
See id. at 56; infra Section VII.C contains a further discussion of the UNFCCC.
99
GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 311; BAILEY, supra note 7, at 65.
100
For example, Clinton issued Executive Orders requiring agencies to purchase more cleanfuel cars, see Exec. Order No. 12,844, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,885 (Apr. 21, 1993), and energyefficient computers, see Exec. Order No. 12,845, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,887 (Apr. 21, 1993).
101
EMILY C. BARBOUR, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED
LEGAL QUESTIONS 10 (2010); REVESZ, supra note 77, at 122.
102
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 78.
103
Id. at 87.
104
Id. at 93.
97

2019]

105

warming” from official governmental reports.105 Some believed that
high-profile, extreme weather events (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) had
been caused in part by climate change,106 and so Bush mentioned
climate change during the 2007 State of the Union,107 issued a couple
of relevant Executive Orders,108 and supported a law establishing
fuel-efficiency requirements for automobiles.109 All the while
research funding continued.110 Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court required the EPA to regulate GHGs under the CAA if
it found that GHGs endangered public health and welfare.111
Outrageously, White House officials responded by preventing the
EPA from making the inevitable endangerment finding.112
President Obama featured climate change during his
campaign,113 and he appointed environmentalists and serious
scientists to high posts in his cabinet.114 A few days after his
inauguration, Obama issued two important memoranda regarding
fuel-efficiency standards,115 and—following Massachusetts—the
The Bush administration was engaged in a “systematic attempt to interfere in the word of
climate scientists within the federal government.” Id. at 97–98.
106
Id. at 102.
107
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007), https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html.
108
Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007) (requiring federal agencies to
“improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions”); Exec. Order. No. 13,432,
72 Fed. Reg. 27717 (May 16, 2007) (declaring it United States policy to protect the
environment from automobile GHG emissions).
109
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 106 (describing Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007).
110
See id. at 94 (establishing the United States Climate Change Research Initiative in 2001).
111
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533 (“If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the [CAA]
requires the Agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor
vehicles.”); REVESZ, supra note 77, at 122–23.
112
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 124–25 (detailing how OIRA refused to open EPA’s email
containing the draft regulation of the endangerment finding and instead took the position that
“the ninety-day review period for agency regulations was triggered when the email containing
a draft regulation was opened, not when it was received”).
113
This is in contrast to Obama’s Republican opponents. At the Republican debate on
December 12, 2007, the Republican presidential candidates were asked to raise their hands if
they believed in climate change. No one raised his hand. See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 118.
114
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 121; GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 339 (commenting that Obama
appointed, for example: Steven Chu, Nobel-prize winning physicist, as Secretary of Energy;
Carol Browner, EPA Administrator under Clinton, as his climate “czar”; and Lisa Jackson,
New Jersey’s Commissioner of Environmental Protection, as EPA Administrator).
115
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 122 (noting that the first directed Department of Transportation
105
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EPA quickly made an endangerment finding and issued a new fuel
efficiency rule.116 In the stimulus bill of 2009, between $30 and $90
billion went to support clean energy projects.117 And further
memoranda and Executive Orders instructed federal agencies to
move towards sustainability.118 After multiple unsuccessful attempts
to pass a comprehensive GHG cap-and-trade bill in years prior,119 the
111th Congress came closest, but the bill failed in the Senate in
2010.120 Still, Obama assured the world that by 2050, the United
States would reduce its GHG emissions to 83 percent below 2005
levels.121
Following his reelection, Obama explained to the nation the
imperative for fast action,122 and then outlined in his Climate Action
Plan of 2013 the executive avenues he would pursue to mitigate

to finalize regulations stemming from the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act, and
the second instructed EPA to reconsider California’s waiver request regarding national fuelefficiency standards).
116
See John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Cars, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/science/earth/02emit.html
(describing the Tailpipe Rule). Both the endangerment finding and Tailpipe Rule were upheld
in court. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014).
117
See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. (2009);
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 126; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, (Feb.
25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/fact-sheetrecovery-act-made-largest-single-investment-clean-energy.
118
PEEL, supra note 31, at 148 (describing Exec. Order 13,514, which required federal
agencies to detail by June 2012 the adaptation measures they would undertake in their
operations, programs, and policies); CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION 2 (Feb. 2012); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 125.
119
BREWER, supra note 4, at 152–53 (recounting the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses’ tries).
120
Id. at 157–70. For commentary on why the bill failed, see REVESZ, supra note 77, at 126
(noting that cap-and-trade was not a novel approach—it had succeeded in the Acid Rain
Deposition Program in the 1990s); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 8 (positing that the wider
economic depression in the U.S. put Democratic Senators from “coal states” between a rock
and a hard place); GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 345 (proposing an alternative explanation that
the bill was “festooned with unpredictable complications some members did not pretend to
understand”).
121
See GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 347.
122
Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013) (declaring in his Second Inaugural that
“we will respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would
betray our children and future generations”); Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb.
12, 2013) (warning that “if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will”).
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climate change and adapt to its effects.123 Shortly thereafter, the EPA
rolled out its Clean Power Plan (CPP), intended to curtail GHG
emissions from existing coal-fired power plants, a major exclusion
from the CAA.124 The CPP—along with the Transport Rule125 and
the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards126—were attacked as Obama’s
“War on Coal.”127 A further Executive Order explicitly instructed
federal agencies to focus on adaptation and “preparedness
planning.”128 Finally, Obama helped engineer the landmark Paris
Climate Agreement in 2015.129
Under President Trump, the federal government has changed
course. Before assuming the presidency, Trump often tweeted that
climate change was a hoax.130 As of June 1, 2017, by one
commentator’s assessment, Trump had tweeted climate change
skepticism 115 times.131 As president, Trump has appointed cabinet
members who deny that climate change exists,132 and some federal
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June
2013); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 143; PEEL, supra note 31, at 148 (detailing the plan’s
adaptation steps).
124
See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (hereinafter “the CPP”). The CPP was
only one of the EPA’s efforts. For more, see BREWER, supra note 4, at 174–75.
125
Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011).
126
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9403 (Feb. 16, 2012).
127
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 3.
128
PEEL, supra note 31, at 148.
129
John D. Sutter et al., Obama: Climate Agreement ‘Best Chance We Have’ To Save the
Planet, CNN (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/12/world/global-climatechange-conference-vote/.
130
See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Mar. 28, 2012, 11:43 am),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/185074709111644160?lang=en
(“Global
warming has been proven to be a canard repeatedly over and over again.”); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER,
(Nov.
6,
2012,
11:15
am),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en (“The concept of
global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing noncompetitive.”).
131
See supra note 7.
132
Scott Pruitt—the former Administrator of Trump’s EPA—had received almost $300,000
in campaign contributions from the fossil fuel industry and sued the EPA repeatedly as
123

108

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

agencies have erased the phrase “climate change” from their
websites.133 More formally, Trump has rolled back scores of
consequential rules and initiatives focused on climate change
mitigation or adaptation.134 In one of his first official acts, Trump
ordered federal agencies to expedite environmental reviews of fossil
fuel infrastructure projects, such as the Dakota Access Pipeline.135
And later in 2017, Trump revoked an Obama-era order that required
federal agencies to consider sea level rise and flood projections when
planning agency actions.136 Perhaps most importantly, Trump
ordered the EPA to review the CPP,137 and, since then, the EPA has
proposed its repeal and replacement.138
Oklahoma’s Attorney General. See Sammy Roth, Scott Pruitt, Trump’s EPA Pick, Rejects
Climate Science and Fights For Fossil Fuels, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/environment/2016/12/09/scott-pruitt-trumps-epapick-rejects-climate-science-and-fights-fossil-fuels/95200658/. Additionally, he does not
believe that CO2 is a primary contributor to global warming. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief
Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html. Nor
does he believe that global warming “necessarily is a bad thing.” See Oliver Milman, EPA
Head Scott Pruitt Says Global Warming May Help ‘Humans Flourish’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb.
7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/07/epa-head-scott-pruittsays-global-warming-may-help-humans-flourish. Rick Perry—the Secretary of Trump’s
DOE—has also denied that anthropogenic CO2 is the primary contributor to climate change.
Tom DiChristopher, Energy Secretary Rick Perry Says CO2 Is Not the Main Driver of Climate
Change, CNBC (June 19, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/19/energy-sec-rick-perrysays-co2-is-not-the-main-driver-of-climate-change.html.
133
Coral Davenport, How Much Has ‘Climate Change’ Been Scrubbed from Federal
Websites? A Lot., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
01/10/climate/climate-change-trump.html?rref=climate; Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Scrubs a
Climate Website of ‘Climate Change’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/climate/epa-climate-change.html (examining EPA’s
website in particular).
134
See supra note 17. To keep further track, see HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW PROGRAM,
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/POLICY-INITIATIVE/REGULATORY-ROLLBACKTRACKER/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018); COLUM. LAW SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE LAW, http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/ (last
visited Dec. 20, 2018).
135
Exec. Order No. 13,766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017).
136
Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 15, 2017).
137
Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
138
The process is now in notice-and-comment. See EPA Issues Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to Replace Clean Power Plan, COLUM. LAW SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE LAW (Dec. 28, 2017), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-
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B. The United States government promoted fossil fuels—and GHG
emissions—in the transportation and electricity-generation sectors
In the United States, GHG emissions from two economic
sectors—transportation and electricity-generation—are responsible
for about two-thirds of the country’s cumulative total emissions.139
The two sectors rely heavily on burning fossil fuels for energy.140
That reliance is the result of a long history of federal regulations that
have favored and incentivized fossil fuel companies: The success of
the fossil fuel industry was not written in the stars.141 Today, among
dozens of industrialized countries, the United States has the secondworst effective carbon tax rate: the average is $68.40 per metric ton
of CO2, but the United States imposes just $6.30.142 Through
legislation and regulation, the United States government created the
conditions—incentivizing massive infrastructure and capital
investments—for these industries to thrive.
1. Transportation
a. Highway infrastructure
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States
tracker/epa-issues-advance-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-to-replace-clean-power-plan/.
139
See CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 13 (reporting that since 1990
electricity has produced 31% and transportation 26%).
140

Fossil fuels are abundant, cheap, and reliable. For a full-throated defense of fossil fuel
use in the past and advocating for accelerated use of them into the future, see ALEX EPSTEIN,
THE MORAL CASE FOR FOSSIL FUELS (2014).
141
Note that state and local governments, too, are responsible for portions of energy
regulation. See, e.g., State & Local Government, DEP’T ENERGY, https://energy.gov/energyeconomy/state-local-government (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). However, the federal
government’s unique role in regulating interstate commerce makes it the most responsible
party in electricity regulation.
142
See Eduardo Porter, In Energy Taxes, Tools to Help Tackle Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/business/energy-tax-is-underused-toolin-climate-change-fight.html; Brad Plumer, The U.S. Has Some of the Lowest Energy Taxes
in
the
Developed
World,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2013)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/31/how-the-world-taxes-fossilfuels-in-three-charts/?utm_term=.cada33754636.
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government has financed a massive interstate highway system and
incentivized people to use it. As a result, Americans use by far the
most vehicles of any people in the world in both absolute and per
capita terms—there is about one car per person in the United States.143
Only in 1907 did the Supreme Court confirm that the federal
government could “construct interstate highways.”144 Ford’s Model
T hit the market in 1908,145 and multiple federal laws subsequently
provided federal funds for states to build highways.146 But road
building in the United States did not gain serious steam until the New
Deal, when it became a major goal of several federal agencies. The
Works Progress Administration alone oversaw the building of
650,000 miles of road.147 After World War II, Congress further
funded the fledgling interstate highway system, but progress was slow
until President Eisenhower in the 1950s prioritized the interstate
highway system.148 “More than any single action by the government
since the end of the war, this one would change the face of America,”
Eisenhower wrote after his presidency.149
143

The United States has by far the most vehicles in the world, in both gross and per capita
terms. As of 2011, the United States had 239.8 million cars, for 23.6% of the world’s total.
China had the second-most cars in absolute terms, with 78 million, for 7.7%. See Daniel
Tencer, Number of Cars Worldwide Surpasses 1 Billion, HUFFPOST (Aug. 23, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/08/23/car-population_n_934291.html. As of 2014, the
United States had over 800 vehicles per 1000 people. Canada had the second-most vehicles
per thousand people, with 656 vehicles. The United States had the same rate in 1976. See Fact
#962: January 30, 2017 Vehicles Per Capita, DEP’T ENERGY (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-962-january-30-2017-vehicles-capita-otherregionscountries-compared-united-states.
144
Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 35 (1907) (using the Commerce Clause as a basis).
145
Our History, FORD, https://corporate.ford.com/history.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
146
See, e.g., Brief History of the Direct Federal Highway Construction Program, DEP’T
TRANSP. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/blazer01.cfm (detailing,
for example, the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 and the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921).
147
Chip Reid, FDR’s New Deal Blueprint for Obama, CBS NEWS (Dec. 14, 2008),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fdrs-new-deal-blueprint-for-obama/.
148
See, e.g., The Interstate Highway System, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/
topics/interstate-highway-system (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (documenting the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1956, which called for 41,000 more miles of interstate highways and
appropriated $25 billion for that purpose from 1957 to 1969); History of the Interstate
Highway System, DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/interstate/history.cfm (last
visited Dec. 20, 2018).
149
PETE DAVIES, AMERICAN ROAD: THE STORY OF AN EPIC TRANSCONTINENTAL JOURNEY AT
THE DAWN OF THE MOTOR AGE 215 (2002).
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At the same time, the federal government was uninterested in
funding mass transportation,150 which, by substituting for personal
vehicle use, is effective in lowering GHG emissions.151 As a result,
Americans use public transit much less than do people in comparable,
industrialized countries.152 In 1962, President Kennedy called on
Congress to establish federal funding for mass transit to limit urban
sprawl facilitated by the interstate highway system.153 In 1964,
Congress responded by establishing an agency to provide “financial
and technical assistance to local public transit systems,”154 but
funding has been scarce.155 Today, federal funding for public transit
is one-quarter of that for highway and bridge improvements.156

150

See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 27–28 (“[S]upport for public transportation has also been
limited in a country with a deeply ingrained ‘car culture’ and cities designed around the . . .
automobile.”).
151
See generally The Benefits of Public Transportation, AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N,
https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/documents/greenhouse_brochure.p
df (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
152
See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., MAKING TRANSIT WORK: INSIGHT FROM WESTERN EUROPE,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES – SPECIAL REPORT 257 1 (2001) (finding that in 2001
public transit was “used for about 10 percent of urban trips in Western Europe, compared
with about 2 percent in the United States.”); Ralph Buehler, 9 Reasons the U.S. Ended Up So
Much More Car-Dependent Than Europe, CITYLAB (Feb. 4, 2014),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2014/02/9-reasons-us-ended-so-much-more-cardependent-europe/8226/ (noting that in 2010, Americans drove on 85% of daily trips, which
was 20 to 35% more than their European counterparts).
153
About FTA, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., https://www.transit.dot.gov/about-fta (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018).
154
See id. (discussing the establishment of the Urban Mass Transit Administration, the
precursor to today’s Federal Transit Authority, which sits within the DOT).
155
Since 1993, the Mass Transit Account has received $2.86 per gallon from the $18.4 per
gallon gas tax. See id. More recently, in 2015, Congress passed five-year transportation
legislation—the “first long-term transportation funding bill in a decade.” See Brian Usher,
It’s Great We Finally Have a Transit Funding Bill—But There’s More to Do, WIRED (Dec.
14, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/its-great-we-finally-have-a-transit-funding-billbut-theres-more-to-do/. The legislation allocates about $12 billion per year to the Mass
Transit Account. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. ROAD & TRANSP. BUILDERS ASS’N,
https://www.artba.org/about/faq/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (see question “What is the
federal government’s annual investment in transportation improvements?”).
156
See id.; but cf. Aarian Marshall, US Cities, Spurned By Washington, Fund Transit
Themselves, WIRED (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/us-cities-spurnedwashington-fund-transit/ (describing cities attempting to fill this perceived gap).
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b. Favorable treatment for oil and gas companies
In addition to funding and building America’s interstate
highways, the United States has encouraged their use by artificially
suppressing the price of gas that consumers buy at the pumps, giving
huge tax breaks to oil companies, and granting federal easements for
oil production and transport. The United States currently imposes a
federal gas tax of just 18.4 cents per gallon.157 Even including state
and local gas taxes, the effective rate in the United States ranks near
the bottom among industrialized countries.158 Initiated in 1932 at one
cent per gallon, Congress barely increased the gas tax over the
ensuing decades, even as cars widely proliferated.159 The gas tax was
last raised in 1993 and is not indexed to inflation.160 Today, 84 percent
of the gas tax enters a separate fund that pays for repairs to and
expansions of the interstate highway system.161 In contrast, in many
European countries, gas taxes siphon into the general revenue fund.162
The federal government has favored oil and gas companies
157

See Plumer, supra note 142. At time of writing, there is a possibility that Congress will
raise the gas tax by 25 cents per gallon to fund President Trump’s proposal for infrastructure
spending. See Trump Backs 25-Cent-a-Gallon Gasoline Tax Hike: Senator, REUTERS (Feb.
14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-infrastructure/trump-backs-25cent-a-gallon-gasoline-tax-hike-senator-idUSKCN1FY33T.
158
Plumer, supra note 142 (noting that the tax averaged across the 50 states is 30.3 cents per
gallon). Note also that economic experts generally agree that taxing the carbon content of fuel
more heavily would be perhaps the best way of reducing GHG emissions from automobiles.
See,
e.g.,
Carbon
Tax,
IGM
FORUM
(Dec.
20,
2011),
http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax. For one such carbon tax proposal, although
on a scale beyond just the automobile universe, see GILBERT E. METCALF, DESIGNING A
CARBON TAX TO REDUCE U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2008).
159
Ask the Rambler, DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/gastax.cfm
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
160
See Emily Atkin, The Solution to Trump’s Infrastructure Problems: Raise the Gas Tax,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 23, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147042/solutiontrumps-infrastructure-problems-raise-gas-tax.
161
Ask the Rambler, supra note 159 (explaining that the other 2.86 cents per gallon goes to a
Mass Transit Account); Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POLICY CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-major-federal-excise-taxes-andhow-much-money-do-they-raise (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). Still, the federal government has
dipped into general revenue funds to cover the cost of roadway expenditures. See Gasoline
Tax Hike, supra note 157 (“Congress has transferred nearly $140 billion to the Highway Trust
Fund since 2008.”).
162
See Buehler, supra note 152 (emphasizing that in European countries, roadway
construction competes for funding).
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through the tax code since the early twentieth century; governmentsanctioned subsidies continue in full force. Today, several large oil
and gas companies regularly pay either no or negative taxes,163 even
though they are among the most profitable companies in the United
States. Most believe that the United States subsidizes oil and gas
companies at least $4 billion per year,164 but it is possibly much more,
if one defines “subsidy” more broadly.165 Such governmentsponsored incentives have existed since 1916, when Congress first
allowed oil and gas companies to deduct their “intangible drilling
costs” incurred in the first year of exploration.166 In 2015, the United
States itself estimated that this tax break led to foregone revenue of
$1.63 billion.167 In 1926, Congress added another loophole—the
“depletion allowance”—which allowed oil companies to deduct 27.5
percent of their gross revenues.168 Despite multiple attempts over the

Heather Long, America’s 20 Largest Companies on the Tax Overhaul, THE WASH. POST
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/business/corporations-taxcut-gop-tax-bill/?utm_term=.dc9e56b403f7; Patricia Cohen, Profitable Companies, No
Taxes: Here’s How They
Did It, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/business/economy/corporate-tax-report.html (listing
18 Fortune 500 companies—14 energy companies—that paid no income tax from 2008 to
2015).
164
E.g., Robert Rapier, The Surprising Reason That Oil Subsidies Persist: Even Liberals
Love Them, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource
/2012/04/25/the-surprising-reason-that-oil-subsidies-persist-even-liberals-lovethem/#6982b1e63279.
165
See Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Overview, OIL CHANGE INT’L, http://priceofoil.org/fossil-fuelsubsidies/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (“As of October 2017, Oil Change International
estimates United States fossil fuel exploration and production subsidies at $20.5 billion
annually.”).
166
See Mark J. Perry & Ryan Alexander, Does the Oil-and-Gas Industry Still Need Tax
Breaks?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-the-oil-and-gasindustry-still-need-tax-breaks-1479092522; see also Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System,
supra note 161 (“Intangible drilling costs cover the labor, machinery, and materials needed
for drilling and developing oil and gas wells and coal mines.”).
163

167

See Perry, supra note 166; Alex Park et al., A Brief History of Big Tax Breaks for Oil
Companies, MOTHERJONES (Apr. 14, 2014) https://www.motherjones.com/politics
/2014/04/oil-subsidies-energy-timeline/.
168
See id. (observing that the senator who proposed the allowance settled on 27.5% “because
we were . . . hogs . . . [and] the odd figure made it appear as though it was scientifically arrived
at”).
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years to cabin or repeal the depletion allowance,169 the allowance still
exists at 15 percent170 and allows virtually all but the biggest oil and
gas companies to recover their drilling costs.171
The significant incentives continue in the present day. In
1995, for instance, Congress allowed certain oil and gas companies
to drill in deep federal waters without paying royalties, a decision that
could have cost the federal government up to $80 billion.172 Still,
President Trump recently extended allowances for offshore drilling in
“nearly all United States coastal waters.”173 Even though many oil
and gas companies already pay far lower than the corporate tax
rate,174 the recent tax cut will likely gift oil and gas companies a
further $1 billion.175 Perhaps most disturbingly, Congress opened the
Alaska National Wildlife Refuge to potential oil exploration in the
next decade.176 The United States has also supported the oil and gas
industries by granting federal easements for oil pipelines, such as the
Dakota Access Pipeline.177 Another such easement will likely be
169

Id. (citing attempts by Presidents Roosevelt (1937), Truman (1950), Kennedy (1960)).
26 U.S.C. § 613(b)(2)(B) (2012).
171
See Steven Mufson, How Much Do Oil Companies Really Pay In Taxes?, THE WASH.
POST (May 11, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-much-dooil-companies-really-pay-intaxes/2011/05/11/AF7UNutG_story.html?utm_term=.d8240db43165.
172
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-369T, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES:
ROYALTY RELIEF WILL LIKELY COST THE GOVERNMENT BILLIONS, BUT THE FINAL COSTS
HAVE YET TO BE DETERMINED: HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (2007) (statement of Mark E. Gaffigan, Acting Director, Natural Resources and
Environment).
173
Lisa Friedman, Trump Moves to Open Nearly All Offshore Waters to Drilling, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/climate/trump-offshore-drilling.html.
174
See Mufson, supra note 171 (noting that despite the corporate tax rate of 35%, Exxon
Mobil in 2010 paid under 18% in federal taxes).
175
See Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: The GOP Tax Plan Is a Windfall For Oil and Gas
Industry,
THE
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/12/21/theenergy-202-the-gop-tax-plan-is-a-windfall-for-oil-and-gasindustry/5a3afa4d30fb0469e883fd40/?utm_term=.a40275ea3067.
176
Elizabeth Harball, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Battle Ends, But Drilling Not A Given,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/21/572439797/arcticnational-wildlife-refuge-battle-ends-but-drilling-not-a-given.
177
Rebecca Hersher, Army Approves Dakota Access Pipeline Route, Paving Way For The
Project’s
Completion,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/07/513951600/army-approves-dakota170
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required for the Keystone XL Pipeline’s new path.178
2. Electricity-generation: coal, natural gas, and renewables
a. Coal
Coal, which is mined mostly in Wyoming and Appalachia,179
still generates the second-largest share of electricity in the United
States, mostly through coal-fired power plants.180 But the coal
industry’s market share in the electricity-generating sector has been
shrinking since the 1980s.181 Government subsidies have long
encouraged coal mining in the United States, although they are
somewhat smaller182 and more difficult to quantify183 than those for
oil.
Smokestack plumes have long made clear the dirty nature of
coal-fired power plants.184 Thus, new and modified coal-fired power
plants are strictly regulated under the CAA. As a result, likely no more
new coal-fired power plants will be built in the United States.185 Still,
access-pipeline-route-paving-way-for-the-projects-completio.
178
Mitch Smith, Nebraska Allows Keystone XL Pipeline, But Picks a Different Path, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/nebraska-pipelinekeystone-xl.html.
179
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 8.
180
Id. at 9.
181
See id., for a discussion indicating this trend will likely continue. See also Benjamin
Storrow, Will the U.S. Ever Build Another Big Coal Plant?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-the-u-s-ever-build-another-big-coal-plant/;
Jeff Nesbit, Coal’s Continuing Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/opinion/trump-coaldecline.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-leftregion&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region.
182
David Roberts, Friendly Policies Keep US Oil and Coal Afloat Far More Than We
Thought, VOX (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/
2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-subsidies (attributing 20% of federal fossil fuel subsidies to
coal and 80% to oil and gas).
183
Jeff Johnson, Long History of U.S. Energy Subsidies, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Dec. 19,
2011), https://cen.acs.org/articles/89/i51/Long-History-US-Energy-Subsidies.html.
184
Cf. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 240 U.S. 650 (1916) (finding a public nuisance based on
smokestacks releasing pollutants from copper smelting that drifted across border into
Georgia).
185
See Storrow, supra note 181.
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existing coal-fired power plants are the largest CO2 contributors
worldwide, and the United States’ coal consumption alone in 2011
constituted 13 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions.186 The great sin
of the CAA, then, was exempting existing power plants from its
coverage.187
President Obama’s CPP—which required “significant
reductions in plants’ emission of carbon dioxide”188—was the first
attempt to regulate these existing plants’ GHG emissions.189 But it
was short-lived: the Supreme Court stayed the CPP nationwide in
February 2016.190 President Trump by Executive Order signaled his
intention to review the CPP,191 and EPA followed suit by proposing
to repeal it.192 The federal government under President Trump
continues propping up the dying coal industry.193 For example,
Trump has encouraged coal mining on federally owned lands,194 the
effective tax rate for coal remains under one percent, and Wyoming’s
Power River Basin will continue to receive nearly $1 billion in annual
subsidies.195
186

Bobby Magill, Coal Plants Lock in 300 Billion Tons of CO2 Emissions, CLIMATE CENT.
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/coal-plants-lock-in-300-billion-tonsof-co2-emissions-17950.
187
See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 3.
188
Id. at 2. In fact, the CPP would have “reduced greenhouse-gas emissions from the power
sector 32 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.” See Coral Davenport et al., What Is the Clean
Power Plan, and How Can Trump Repeal It?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/climate/epa-clean-power-plan.html; REVESZ, supra
note 77, at 151 (delving into the CPP’s details).
189
See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 4; the CPP, supra note 124.
190
Adam Liptak and Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to
Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html.
191
Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 137; Coral Davenport and Alissa J. Rubin, Trump
Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama Climate Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-executive-order-climate-change.html.
192
See Friedman, supra note 71. There is no replacement plan yet.
193
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Joseph Goffman, Rick Perry’s Anti-Market Plan to Help Coal,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/opinion/rick-perry-coalantimarket.html.
194
Eric Lipton and Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trumpcoal-mining-gets-new-life-on-us-lands.html.
195
Emily Atkin, The Tax Bill’s Gift to Big Coal, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 25, 2017),
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b. Natural Gas

While still contributing GHGs to the atmosphere, natural gas
emits only about half as much CO2 as coal in producing the same
amount of energy.196 As such, natural gas is often seen as a bridge
between dirty coal and clean renewables. Since 2015, natural gas has
generated the most electricity in the United States.197 Natural gas did
not overtake coal sooner in large part because the federal government
artificially suppressed the gas supply through price controls.198
Because of the prohibitive expense of building natural gas
pipelines, there was not a big market for natural gas until the 1920s.199
Due to high capital expenses, transport of natural gas presented a
natural monopoly and so Congress enacted a law in 1938 that
entrusted the Federal Power Commission (FPC) with setting “just and
reasonable” rates for interstate gas sales.200 A 1954 Supreme Court
decision expanded the FPC’s regulatory power to the wellhead rate,
which increased the federal government’s control over the natural gas
market. 201 But for the next twenty years the FPC kept wellhead rates
essentially flat, even as demand increased, which artificially
suppressed gas supply by removing the appropriate incentive for
developers.202
Still, by 1970, natural gas’s share of the energy market was
30 percent, about half of coal’s.203 But supply became spotty in the
1970s due to the FPC’s artificially low rates, and so natural gas’s
market share fell to 20 percent.204 Congress attempted in 1978 to

https://newrepublic.com/article/146388/tax-bills-gift-big-coal (Wyoming’s Powder River
Basin is responsible for about 40% of the country’s coal production).
196
Jeffrey Ball, The Oil v. Coal Showdown Is Going to the Next Level, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(Oct. 3, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119693/fossil-fuel-industry-breaks-andattacks-coal.
197
See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 145.
198
Id. at 142.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 142–43 (describing The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (2012)).
201
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
202
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 143.
203
Id. at 142.
204
Id. at 143.
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boost natural gas supply,205 but Congress managed instead (through
another 1978 law) to restrict demand.206 In 1987, Congress finally
fixed the problem by repealing the latter law.207 However, only
recently has the industry skyrocketed due to horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing (fracking), which have made natural gas cheaper:
between 2008 and 2013, natural gas prices fell 50 percent.208 And
today, due to the widespread proliferation of fracking, natural gas has
overtaken coal as the largest electricity-generating fuel in the United
States.209
c. Renewables
Today, renewable sources such as wind, solar, and
hydropower supply almost 15 percent of our energy.210 Even 15
percent is a recent development.211 In 1992, Congress for the first
time issued production tax credits for renewable energy generation,
as well as for electric cars.212 And in 1993, President Clinton
proposed a tax on all non-renewable energy sources,213 but the
proposal did not pass.214 But times changed: in 2008, annual tax
subsidies for renewable energy sources surpassed those that Congress
205

Paul L. Joskow, Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in the United States, 103
AM. ECON. REV. 338, 338 (2013) (describing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978).
206
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 144 (explaining how Congress, through the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, limited construction of new gas-fired power plants).
207
Id. (reporting that the latter law was repealed, and thus more gas-fired plants were built).
208
Id. at 145.
209
See id.; see also Tim Meko and Laris Karklis, The United States of Oil and Gas, THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/unitedstates-of-oil/ (detailing the recent boom and potential areas of expansion in the future).
210
See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=92&t=4; DON PHILPOTT, CRITICAL GOVERNMENT
DOCUMENTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 137 (2015) (suggesting that with effort, by 2050, about
80% of our energy could come from renewable sources).
211
See, e.g., Energy Sources Have Changed Throughout the History of the United States,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(July
3,
2013),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=11951.
212
See Park et al., supra note 167 (describing the Energy Policy Act); Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit, DEP’T ENERGY, https://energy.gov/savings/renewable-electricityproduction-tax-credit-ptc (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
213
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120; BREWER, supra note 4, at 150.
214
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 69 (noting that, as a compromise, the gas tax was raised slightly).
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supplied for oil and gas.215 In the stimulus bill of 2009, between $30
and $90 billion went to “clean energy investments and tax
incentives.”216 Several times since 2009 the production tax credit has
been extended.217 And even in the most recent tax bill, subsidies for
the renewable energy industry survived mostly intact.218 These
subsidies are popular: traditionally red states, like Texas, are some of
the largest consumers of renewables and so stand to benefit the most
from these subsidies.219 The prices of renewable energy promise to
remain low even if and when federal subsidies do expire.220
IV. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY DUTIES TO MITIGATE GHG EMISSIONS AND ADAPT
TO THEIR EFFECTS
The Fifth Amendment’s limitation on the federal
government’s power—“nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation”221—is easily reformulated as a
constitutional duty not to take private property without paying just
compensation. For example, recall that the government has a duty to
pay just compensation for taking private property when it has caused
that property to be flooded, even temporarily.222 This duty covers
particular and limited instances of physical invasions in the climate
change context: some inundations of private property by sea level rise
and by storm surge, and some destructions by wildfire, for example.
Determining when the federal government has breached this duty and
caused the relevant harm is the subject of Section VII.D infra.
215

Park et al., supra note 167.
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 117.
217
See Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit, supra note 212.
218
Grandoni, supra note 175; Plumer, supra note 72.
219
Ryan Maye Handy, Wind Power Blows Past Coal in Texas, HOUSTON CHRON. (Dec. 4,
2017),
http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Wind-power-blows-past-coat-inTexas-12386751.php (revealing that in Texas, for example, wind supplies 15% of the power
mix and in 2019 will likely overtake coal as the state’s second-largest source of energy).
220
Justin Gillis and Hal Harvey, Why a Big Utility is Embracing Wind and Solar, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/opinion/utility-embracing-windsolar.html.
221
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
222
See supra Part II.
216
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Various parts of the federal government—Departments,
agencies, commissions—are also under statutory duties (some more
specific than others) to mitigate and adapt to certain climate change
effects. For example,223 power-granting statutes (or orders) for the
following federal entities commit all of them to consider and act upon
various climate change effects:
(1) The Department of Energy (DOE), particularly
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC);
(2) The Department of Transportation (DOT);
(3) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);
(4) The Department of Interior (DOI), particularly the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM);
(5) The United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), particularly the United States Forest
Service; and
(6) The United States Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), particularly the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Created in 1977 in the wake of an energy crisis,224 the DOE
consolidated federal energy authority to make a “coordinated and
effective administration of Federal energy policy and programs.”225
The Department’s charge is to “deal with the short-, mid- and longterm energy problems of the Nation.”226 And Congress instructed the
Department to “place major emphasis on the development and
commercial use of solar, geothermal, recycling and other
technologies utilizing renewable energy resources.”227 In 1980,
Congress amended the DOE’s enabling statute and instructed DOE
223

What follows is a non-exhaustive list; there may well be more such duties.
Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2012).
225
42 U.S.C. § 7112 (2012).
226
42 U.S.C. § 7112(3) (2012).
227
See 42 U.S.C. § 7112(6) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7372 (2012) (defining “renewable
energy sources”).
224
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“to establish incentives for the use of renewable energy resources, to
improve and coordinate the dissemination of information to the public
with respect to renewable energy resources, [and] to encourage the
use of certain cost effective solar energy systems and conservation
measures by the Federal Government.”228
FERC is the successor to the FPC, which Congress
established in 1920.229 Congress granted the FPC power over
hydroelectric permitting and licensing, interstate electricity
transmission and sales,230 and the natural gas industry, too.231 As the
FPC’s successor, FERC’s jurisdiction is broad, extending to “the
establishment, review, and enforcement of rates and charges for the
transmission or sale of electric energy,”232 the “interconnection . . . of
facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric
energy,”233 and the “establishment, review, and enforcement of rates
and charges for the transmission and sale of natural gas.”234 Thus,
FERC and the DOE are the main regulators of electricity and natural
gas markets,235 and they are required to “establish incentives for the
use of renewable energy resources.”236
Created in 1966,237 the DOT has broad power to set emissions
standards in the transportation sector,238 which accounts for about 27
228

42 U.S.C. § 7371 (2012).
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (2012).
230
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (“[T]he business of transmitting and selling electric energy
[in interstate commerce] for ultimate distribution to the public.”).
231
Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2012).
232
42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(B) (2012).
233
Id.
234
42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C) (2012).
235
It is true that individual States have historically played—and continue to play—a
significant role in regulating intrastate energy distribution. See, e.g., JOEL B. EISEN ET AL.,
ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 79 (4th ed. 2015) (“Today, every state has
some sort of commission or agency charged with regulating different types of public utilities
in the energy sector.”). Still, while the national energy market is a system of cooperative
federalism, FERC and DOE are the most important and powerful institutions in it.
236
42 U.S.C.A. § 7371 (West 2012).
237
Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012); see also Creation of
Department of Transportation – Summary, DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov
/50/creation-department-transportation-summary (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that the
DOT includes the Federal Railroad, Highway, and Transit Administrations).
238
See Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1246.
229
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percent of the United States’ annual CO2 emissions.239 Congress
instructed the DOT to “provid[e] fast, safe, efficient, and convenient
transportation at the lowest cost consistent with those and other
national objectives, including the efficient use and conservation of the
resources of the United States.”240 In 1999, Congress created (within
DOT) an Office of Climate Change and Environment explicitly
responsible for planning, coordinating, and implementing “actions . .
. to reduce transportation-related energy use and mitigate the effects
of climate change,”241 and “to address the impacts of climate change
on transportation systems and infrastructure.”242 In addition, the
Office was required to “establish a clearinghouse of solutions . . . to
reduce air pollution and transportation-related energy use and
mitigate the effects of climate change.”243
The EPA has broad power to set emissions standards in both
the transportation and electricity-generating sectors. While the EPA
has no single enabling statute, its founding documents and
developments in the ensuing decades indicate perhaps the strongest
regulatory duty both to mitigate GHG emissions and to adapt to their
effects. In creating the EPA, President Nixon signaled his intent to
organize the “Government’s environmentally-related activities . . .
rationally and systematically.”244 Initially, the EPA was concerned
mostly with pollution, and its original mandate was framed in terms
of “protection of the environment.”245 At that time, air pollution was
understood to refer to local pollutants, not GHGs.
However, in its responsibility of administering various
statutes—the CAA, the ESA, the CWA, and NEPA, for example246—
239

Id.
49 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2012).
241
49 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1)(A) (2012).
242
49 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1)(B) (2012).
243
49 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2012).
244
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2012).
245
See id.; William D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Order 1110.2 – Initial Organization of the EPA,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 4, 1970), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/epa-order11102-initial-organization-epa.html (creating, at the time of EPA’s establishment, five offices
all of which regarded pollution: water quality, air pollution control, pesticides, radiation, and
solid waste).
246
See Laws and Executive Orders, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws240
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the EPA assumes numerous duties related to climate change
effects.247 A particularly prominent example was the judicially
imposed duty to regulate GHGs under the CAA should the EPA
determine that GHGs are pollutants that “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”248 In response, the
EPA made the inevitable endangerment finding.249 The Tailpipe
Rule—setting emissions and mileage standards for cars and light
trucks—followed.250 Regulating GHGs as “pollutants” under the
CAA meant that strict technology-based emissions standards now
applied to new power plants. The EPA has applied these standards
since 2011,251 and the Supreme Court upheld this practice in 2014.252
The DOI,253 too, is under multiple duties to protect against
certain effects of climate change that may be actionable, particularly
with respect to wildfires. It is likely that current levels of wildfire
result in part from increased levels of drought and extreme heat—both
effects of climate change—combined with underuse of prescribed fire
and mechanical thinning.254 The FWS and BLM in particular are
regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that EPA
administers these laws and more that potentially provide a vehicle for fighting GHG
emissions and climate change effects).
247
See PEEL, supra note 31, at 71 (discussing end-around tactics to fight climate change).
248
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532–33 (2007) (holding that such an endangerment finding
would bring the EPA under a mandatory duty established in CAA § 202(a)(1)).
249
See Economics of Climate Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
environmental-economics/economics-climate-change (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (describing
its endangerment finding in Dec. 2009).
250
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits
on Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/04/02/science/earth/02emit.html.
251
New
Source
Review
(NSR)
Permitting,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/clean-air-act-permitting-greenhouse-gases (last visited Dec. 20,
2018) (recounting the EPA’s issuing a Tailoring Rule to limit applicability of the permitting
requirements to the largest stationary sources to avoid the requirements being prohibitively
chilling on electricity generation); Robin Bravender, EPA Issues Final ‘Tailoring’ Rule for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/05/13/13greenwire-epa-issues-final-tailoring-rule-for-greenhouse-32021.html.
252
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., supra note 116.
253
DOI houses the National Park Service, FWS, BLM, Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, among other federal
entities.
254
See, e.g., Matt Weiser, What Needs to be Done to Stop Wildfires in Drought-Killed

124

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

responsible for protecting public and adjacent lands from fire damage.
In fact, Congress increased funding for such firefighting efforts in
order to combat the huge uptick in wildfires.255 Congress also
required the DOI to assess “impacts of climate change on the
frequency and severity of wildfire” and the resulting “level of risk to
communities.”256
The FWS declares that 30 federal laws support its fire
program,257 which is “responsible for protecting more land
management units than any other federal agency” including many
“small coastal and urban tracts with extensive wildland-urban
interface areas.”258 The FWS has since the 1930s been using
controlled burns to prevent “property loss and damage”259 and to
“[m]inimize the risk to people, communities, and natural and cultural
resources.”260
The BLM’s firefighting duty arises both from its
establishment261 and subsequent statutes.262 Since 1976, the BLM has
Forests, NEWSDEEPLY (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/community
/2017/10/11/what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-wildfires-in-drought-killed-forests (citing a U.C.
Berkeley scientist saying that statistics indicated “the number of additional acres that need to
be treated [with prescribed fire is] at somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000 per year. So
a very large amount . . . . [R]ight now the Forest Service is doing somewhere between 100,000
and 200,000 per year”); see also Sherri Eng, Prescribed Burning and Mechanical Thinning
Pose Little Risk to Forest Ecology, DEP’T AGRIC. (Jul. 26, 2012),
https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2012/07/26/prescribed-burning-and-mechanical-thinningpose-little-risk-forest-ecology.
255
43 U.S.C. § 1748a (2012) (beginning in 2009, appropriating to the DOI and USDA
FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve Funds); 43 U.S.C. § 1748a(e)(1) (2012) (instructing
that these funds “are separate from amounts for wildfire suppression activities annually
appropriated to” the DOI and USDA; 43 U.S.C. § 1748b(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring that the
DOI and USDA submit to Congress a report, to be reviewed every five years that, among
other things, identifies cost-effective firefighting measures).
256
43 U.S.C. § 1748b(b)(4), (6) (2012) (note that this requirement applies also to the USDA).
257
See Departmental Manual – 620 DM 1 App. A, DEP’T INTERIOR (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/DocView.aspx?id=4438&dbid=0.
258
What We Do, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/fire/what_we_do/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018).
259
Living With Fire, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/fire/living_with_fire/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2018).
260
Departmental Manual, supra note 257, at 1.7(A) (Risk Management and Risk Reduction).
261
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, 5 U.S.C. app. 1 (2012).
262
See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2012); see also Fire and Aviation Program, BUREAU
LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/public-safety-and-fire/fire-and-aviation (last
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been able to draw upon a “working capital fund” that “shall be
available . . . for expenses necessary for furnishing . . . supplies and
equipment services in support of . . . fire control.”263 The BLM itself
declares that it “is responsible for fire management on 245 million
acres of public lands across the United States.”264 Housed within the
USDA, the Forest Service, too, has since 1897 incurred a statutory
duty to protect “against destruction by fire and depredations upon the
public forests and national forests.”265 As such, the Forest Service
proudly proclaims that it “has been managing wildland fire . . . for
more than 100 years,”266 including by prescribed burns and
mechanical thinning.267
FEMA268 has since at least 1978 also incurred duties related
to property damage and loss of life stemming from fires. 269 FEMA
administers the United States Fire Administration,270 through which,
for example, FEMA is to “review, evaluate, and suggest
improvements in State and local fire prevention codes, building
codes, and any relevant Federal or private codes and regulations.”271
FEMA explains that the United States Fire Administration’s purpose
is to “provide national leadership” in fire “prevention, preparedness
and response.”272
FEMA also administers NFIP, which was established in

visited Dec. 20, 2018).
263
43 U.S.C. § 1736(a) (2012).
264
What We Do, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/public-safety-andfire/fire-and-aviation/about-fire-and-aviation/what-we-do (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
265
16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
266
Wildland Fire, FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/managing-land/fire (last visited Feb.
27, 2018).
267
See Weiser, supra note 254; cf. 16 U.S.C.A. § 551c-1 (West 2016) (detailing that Congress
recently imposed procedural safety and coordination restrictions on prescribed burns, but
preventing wildfire remains a primary duty of the Forest Service).
268
Exec. Order No. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,367 (Mar. 21, 1979).
269
See Reorganization Act No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41,943, (June 19, 1978) (entrusting,
in § 201 (Fire Prevention), to FEMA the functions of the National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration).
270
See 15 U.S.C. § 2204 (2012).
271
15 U.S.C. § 2211 (2012).
272
About the U.S. Fire Administration, U.S. FIRE ADMIN. https://www.usfa.fema.gov
/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
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1968.273 Congress intended NFIP to fill a gap in the private flood
insurance industry in order to “promote the public interest by
providing appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and
encouraging sound land use by minimizing exposure of property to
flood losses.”274 NFIP was to expand “as knowledge is gained and
experience is appraised, thus eventually making flood insurance
coverage available on reasonable terms and conditions to persons
who have need for such protection.”275 NFIP’s purpose was to “guide
the development of proposed future construction . . . away from
locations which are threatened by flood hazards” and to “authorize
continuing studies of flood hazards in order to provide for a constant
reappraisal of the flood insurance program.”276
Today, NFIP is essentially the only flood insurer in the
country; although it was established to stimulate private flood
insurers, it ended up driving them out of the market.277 As a result,
“[s]ince 1983, Washington has set the insurance rates, mapped the
floodplains, [and] written the rules.”278 Climate change’s rapid
progression has made this arrangement unmanageable. For example,
NFIP has been in debt since Hurricane Katrina, and the program
likely will never make it into the black again.279 Congress beat back
273

See The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. (2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 4011(a) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is
authorized to establish and carry out a national flood insurance program which will enable
interested persons to purchase insurance against loss resulting from physical damage to or
loss of real property or personal property related thereto arising from any flood occurring in
the United States.”).
274
42 U.S.C. § 4001(c) (2012).
275
42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012).
276
42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4101b(a) (2012) (“The Administrator .
. . shall establish an ongoing program under which the Administrator shall review, update,
and maintain National Flood Insurance Program rate maps in accordance with this section.”).
277
See Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/a-broke-and-broken-floodinsurance-program.html (“When Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program
in 1968, it hoped to revive the private flood-insurance market . . . . But there were clashes,
and eventually the government drove out the insurers and took over most operations.”); Ann
Carrns, How To Assess Private Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/your-money/how-to-assess-private-floodinsurance.html (describing the slowly returning private flood insurance market).
278
Walsh, supra note 277.
279
See id.; see also PEEL, supra note 31, at 163 (“It is widely recognized that [NFIP] is not
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FEMA’s recent attempt to raise NFIP premiums to reflect “true flood
risk” because of the premiums’ unpopularity.280 A sunset provision
retired NFIP in September 2017,281 and Congress currently has until
May 31, 2019 to reauthorize it, even if in a reduced form.282
Combined with FEMA’s responsibilities in administering
NFIP—“guid[ing] the development of proposed future construction .
. . away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards” and
“provid[ing] for a constant reappraisal of the flood insurance
program”283—is FEMA’s responsibility to identify flood-prone areas
by making and publishing flood maps that inform NFIP’s rates.284
That is, FEMA must “establish or update flood-risk zone data in all
[flood plain and coastal] areas, and make estimates with respect to the
rates of probable flood caused loss for the various flood zones for
each of these areas.”285 FEMA determines flood elevations and areas
with special flood hazards.286 In addition, FEMA must, “based on an
analysis of all natural hazards affecting flood risks,” reassess these
maps every five years.287
FEMA itself acknowledges that its map-drawing and updating duties pose “a challenge” that has often led to outdated flood
maps and unreflective insurance.288 For example, following
financially sustainable and that this will only be exacerbated by . . . more weather-related
disasters.”).
280
Id. at 149 (explaining that the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization
Act of 2012, see Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012), allowed FEMA to attempt to
raise the premiums that would appropriately disincentivize people from building on coastal
property, but the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, see Pub. L. No.
113-89, 128 Stat. 1010 (2014), dealt FEMA a setback).
281
42 U.S.C. § 4026 (2012).
282
See National Flood Insurance Program: Reauthorization, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/national-floodinsurance-program-reauthorization-guidance (last updated Dec. 23, 2018).
283
42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012).
284
See, e.g., National Flood Insurance Program: Flood Hazard Mapping, FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-flood-hazardmapping (last updated Sept. 19, 2018).
285
42 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(2) (2012).
286
42 U.S.C. § 4104(a) (2012).
287
42 U.S.C. § 4101(e) (2012).
288
See Flood Map Revision Processes, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/flood-map-revision-processes (last updated Sept. 14, 2019); cf. Exec.
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Hurricane Harvey in 2017, it came to light that “[a]bout 40 percent of
the buildings estimated by [FEMA] to have been flooded in Harris
County, Tex., are in areas considered to be ‘of minimal flood
hazard.’”289 FEMA is only now updating New York City’s flood
maps for the first time since 1983, even though Hurricane Sandy in
2012 drew into focus those maps’ inadequacy.290
In sum, multiple federal entities bear constitutional and
statutory duties—some general, others more specific—to address the
effects of climate change, such as increased incidents of flooding and
wildfire, in certain instances. None of these duties mandates that the
federal government immediately do everything humanly possible to
combat the chance that a flood or wildfire will invade private
property. But, when the government knew or should have known that
its inadequate action or inaction posed significant risk of serious harm
to private property, breach of some of the above duties—such as
failing to update flood maps properly or failing to manage overgrown
forests—can serve as the basis for government’s liability, see infra
Part VII.
VI. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S INACTIVITY—ITS
FAILURE TO ADAPT TO CERTAIN CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS—
CAN SUPPORT AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM
Both the government’s actions in promoting GHG emissions
and its inaction in failing to adapt to certain climate change effects
which it had a duty to address will support a successful inverse
condemnation claim. This paper argues that inaction may support
Order No. 13,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 6425 (Jan. 30, 2015) (outlining Obama’s attempt to
streamline these mapping duties); but see GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 351 (reporting Governor
Andrew Cuomo’s quip to Obama in Oct. 2012: “We have a hundred-year flood every two
years now”).
289
Ford Fessenden et al., Water Damage From Hurricane Harvey Extended Far Beyond
Flood
Zones,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/01/us/houston-damaged-buildings-in-femaflood-zones.html; see also John Schwartz et al., Builders Said Their Homes Were Out of a
Flood
Zone.
Then
Harvey
Came.,
N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
2,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/us/houston-flood-zone-hurricane-harvey.html.
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See Chen, supra note 65.
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such a claim when it is more likely than not that the government knew
or should have known that its inactivity would lead to significant risk
of serious harm to private property. Holding the government
accountable based in part on its inaction is not a novel legal theory.291
Even if still somewhat outside the mainstream, courts should
recognize the theory because legal philosophy supports this result.
While not identical to the claim this paper advocates,
plaintiffs’ claim in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t provides the blueprint
for such a successful inverse condemnation claim.292 In Saint Bernard
Par. Gov’t, the court found the federal government liable for a
temporary taking based on both governmental action and inaction.
Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t was born out of the flooding that ensued in
New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005,293 and also
following Hurricanes Rita (2005), Gustav (2008), and Ike (2008). In
the 1950s, with Congress’s blessing, the Army Corps of Engineers
(ACE) had begun constructing the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet
(MR-GO), “a seventy-six-mile-long navigational channel” intended
to make navigation and trade easier.294
After construction was complete in 1968, “the banks eroded

291

Note that some other major areas of law sanction holding governmental agencies
accountable for inactions. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012)
(noting that a reviewing court will “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed”); see also Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s
Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 372 (2014).
292
Note that Saint. Bernard Par. Gov’t is not the only case in which governmental inaction
in the face of an affirmative duty to act has provided part of the basis for a successful inverse
condemnation claim; see also Litz v. Maryland, 131 A.3d 923 (Md. 2016) (noting also that
the Minnesota Constitution Art. I § 13 (as interpreted in Evenson v. City of Saint Paul Bd. of
Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)) explains that an “unconstitutional
taking is a governmental action or inaction that deprives a landowner of all reasonable uses
of its land”); Jordan v. Saint Johns County, 63 So.3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Swartz
v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002); Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 917 A.2d
508 (Vt. 2006); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 99 Cal. App. 4th 722 (2002), as modified on
denial of reh’g (July 23, 2002)); cf. Timothy M. Mulvaney & Joseph William Singer, Move
Along To Where? Property In Service of Democracy (A Tribute To André Van Der Walt), 19
HARVARD PUB. L. WORKING PAPER NO. 17-40 (2017).
293
Saint. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 712 (disclosing that as a result of Hurricane
Katrina, somewhere “between 68% and 98% of homes [in Saint Bernard Parish and the Lower
Ninth Ward] were severely damaged or destroyed”).
294
See id. at 691, 698.
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at an estimated twenty-seven to thirty-eight feet per year.”295 Even
during construction, the ACE was aware that during a big enough
storm, the MR-GO might exacerbate a storm surge into New Orleans
due to a “funneling effect.”296 The ACE became even more aware of
this possible effect as it learned more about the MR-GO’s effects on
salinity, habitat and wetland loss, and erosion.297 The court
concluded:
[I]t was foreseeable to the Army Corps that the
construction, expansion, operation, and failure
to maintain the MR-GO would increase
salinity, increase habitat/land loss, increase
erosion, and increase storm surge that could be
exacerbated by a ‘funnel effect’ and likely
cause flooding of Plaintiffs’ properties in a
hurricane or severe storm.298
During Hurricane Katrina, the MR-GO had just such an effect. The
government was liable in part because it took no action to correct the
problem even when it knew that the failure to maintain the MR-GO
posed a significant risk of serious harm to property in New Orleans.299
In Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, the court found that the ACE constructed
the MR-GO, knew about some of the risks it posed at the time, and
subsequently learned about more. The court further found that by
constructing the channel in the first place, the ACE assumed the duty
of repairing it properly, which they failed to do. So, when Katrina
struck and flooded parts of New Orleans in ways that were
foreseeable to the ACE, the court found the ACE liable for the
temporary taking of those flooded properties by dint of their
constructing the MR-GO and their inaction in not fortifying or
repairing it despite knowledge of its dangers. Saint Bernard Par.
Gov’t establishes that takings liability may arise when “inaction by
295

Id. at 721.
Id. at 700.
297
Id. at 704–06, 720–22 (detailing a Coast 2050 report presented to the ACE in 1998 and an
EPA Task Force report in 2000).
298
Id. at 723.
299
Id. at 704.
296
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the government exacerbates flooding from severe weather through its
failure to properly design or maintain federally owned property.”300
There are important differences between Saint Bernard Par.
Gov’t and the claim this paper advocates. Two such differences
regard the creation of the dangerous condition and, relatedly, the
origin of the government’s duty. First, in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t,
the ACE itself built the MR-GO, whereas in the climate change
context, the United States did not alone create climate change. But, as
this paper argues, the federal government’s liability in this context is
based both on its role in promoting climate change and its failure to
adapt adequately to the particular climate change effect at issue.
Second, while in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t the ACE assumed a duty
to repair the MR-GO by building it in the first place, various entities
within the federal government assume statutory duties to act in certain
instances, see supra Part V. Thus, even though there are important
differences, St. Bernard Par. Gov’t’s rule—that a governmental
entity may be liable for a taking when it is under a duty to act and
knows or should know that its inaction will cause significant risk of
serious harm to private property—applies to the claims advocated
here.
In addition, legal theory supports holding the federal
government liable based in part on its failure to adapt to certain
climate change effects. First, because the federal government is
inextricably intertwined with regulating the electricity and
transportation sectors in the United States, its “active role means it
has active responsibilities” and “cannot divest itself of responsibility
for the allocation of burdens and benefits in society.”301 The federal
government may not throw its hands up now, blameless, because the
federal government has already, through law and regulation, created
the rules of the game and set it in motion for over a century.302
300

JENNIFER KLEIN, POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS FOR FAILURE TO PREPARE FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE 25 (2015).
301
Christopher Serkin, Affirmative Constitutional Commitments: The State’s Obligations to
Property Owners, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 109, 131 (2013).
302
Cf. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION (2015) (making a
similar argument with respect to the federal government’s role in failing to regulate the
housing market in the build-up to the subprime crisis).
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Second, the government should sometimes be held accountable for a
“passive taking”303—its “failure to act in the face of a changing
world”304—because sometimes the Constitution compels the
government to act to protect private property. To ensure that the
government does not become an insurer of last resort, a passive taking
should arise only when “the government is so entangled in the
substantive content of property that the line between acts and
omissions becomes especially blurry.”305 This entanglement exists in
the claims that this paper advocates: the federal government’s
regulating coastal property through NFIP, for example, involves
setting insurance rates that could be seen as both actions and inactions
(in not choosing another rate).
Both as a matter of economic incentives and longstanding
property theory, recognizing passive takings in certain situations is
desirable. Forcing actors to internalize the costs of their actions is a
bedrock principle of economics. But without passive takings, the
government does not internalize the cost of its decisions when
inaction is the “most costly choice of all.”306 As a matter of property
theory more generally, it is well-established that the substantive
content of property rights can change as community needs do.307 As
a result, the government “cannot simply set the rules and then sit on
the sidelines while private parties fight it out.”308
A government should not be liable every time it does not act.
But when the effects of climate change have, more likely than not,
caused a plaintiff’s harm, governmental inaction may form part of the
basis for liability if the government was under a duty to address the
303

See Serkin, supra note 291, at 346.
Id. at 345; see also Serkin, supra note 301, at 118–26 (discussing in more detail property
theorists who recognize the legitimacy of passive takings, particularly Hanoch Dagan’s
theory of average reciprocity and Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver’s theory of
human flourishing).
305
Serkin, supra note 291, at 347.
306
Id. at 347, 361–364.
307
See id. at 370 (“[T]he same regulation that might have been a taking at one time might not
be later as conditions in the world change.”); see id. at 370, n.110 (citing Vill. of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), to support the proposition because in Euclid the
Court found that a zoning regulation that might have constituted a taking in an agrarian society
became okay in the context of property rights in an urbanized environment).
308
Serkin, supra note 291, at 371.
304
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climate change effect at issue and knew or should have known that its
inaction in the face of that duty would lead to significant risk of
serious harm to private property.
V. FIVE-FACTOR TAKINGS TEST: A MODIFICATION OF SAINT
BERNARD PAR. GOV’T/ARK. GAME
In analyzing inverse condemnation claims where the federal
government’s liability is based on its role in bringing about climate
change and failing to respond to its effects, courts should use a
modified version of the five-factor takings test put forth in Saint
Bernard Par. Gov’t and Ark. Game. Those five factors are: (1)
whether the plaintiff asserts a protectable property interest under state
law; (2) the character of the property and the owner’s reasonable,
investment-backed expectations; (3) whether plaintiff’s harm was
foreseeable to the federal government; (4) whether the United States
caused plaintiff’s harm; (5) whether plaintiff’s harm is substantial
enough to rise to the level of a taking.309 The issue requiring the most
attention is causation.
A. Protectable property interest under state law
This prong would not be difficult to satisfy in any of the three
successful scenarios supra. All states recognize property interests in
land;310 in each scenario, plaintiff owns such interest.
B. Character of property interest and owner’s reasonable,
investment-backed expectations
At issue here is whether the plaintiff’s investment-backed
expectations are reasonable, which is often determined by state
law.311 In a takings case concerning flooding (and, by extension, a
wildfire that completely razes a parcel), courts should consider the
reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance on governmental assurances—
See, e.g., Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 719.
See, e.g., id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:1 (1975), which defines property as
“immovable property”).
311
See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 38.
309
310
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through flood maps and flood insurance, for example—that give the
impression that it is safe to build in a certain area. Courts should also
consider plaintiff’s “knowledge of any prior flooding.”312 However,
knowledge of prior flooding (or wildfires) does not equate necessarily
to unreasonable expectations. For example, in Saint Bernard Par.
Gov’t, the court held that despite plaintiffs’ knowledge that their
properties “were in a floodplain and ‘had experienced flooding in the
past,’ that flooding was not ‘comparable’ to the flooding during
Hurricane Katrina . . . giving rise to the temporary takings claim at
issue.”313 Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court refused
to find an owner’s investment-backed expectations unreasonable as a
rule, even when they ran counter to restrictive regulations on the
property that had been in place at the time of acquisition.314
The three successful scenarios supra would satisfy this
examination. Plaintiffs in the flooding scenarios will have relied on
FEMA flood maps before buying and developing their coastal
property, and residents in neighborhoods abutting national forests
will have relied on multiple federal entities’ duties to treat those
forests to prevent fire from spreading. Even if plaintiffs’ harm
resulted from flooding from a recurring storm, such as in the second
successful scenario, it would still be reasonable for plaintiffs to rely
on FEMA’s flood maps and offered insurance. In addition, if
plaintiffs’ harm results from a flood or wildfire not “comparable” to
prior floods or wildfires, plaintiffs’ investment-backed expectations
might still have been reasonable, as the court found in Saint Bernard
Par. Gov’t.
C. Foreseeability
“Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which
the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized
government action.”315 This inquiry will be a factual one about what
Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 719.
Id. at 720 (quoting Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39).
314
533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“Were the Court to accept that rule, the postenactment transfer
of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no
matter how extreme or unreasonable.”); see also SINGER, supra note 39, at 723.
315
Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39.
312
313
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the government knew and when, and it overlaps with the examination
of proximate cause, see infra Section VII.D.ii. Due to scientific
studies that the United States either commissioned or knew of,
important reports and developments in the international community,
and its own actions,316 the federal government cannot earnestly claim
that the floods and fires contemplated by the three scenarios supra
were unforeseeable. A plaintiff could argue that the federal
government was aware, or should have been aware, of the potential
harms of climate change-induced flooding and wildfire by the late
1970s. But by 1990, at the very latest, the government was actually
aware of anthropogenic climate change and its effects, such as
flooding and wildfire: the EPA argued in Massachusetts that it should
not be forced to regulate GHGs under the CAA because “Congress
was well aware of the global climate change issue when it last
comprehensively amended the [CAA] in 1990, yet it declined to adopt
a proposed amendment establishing binding emissions
limitations.”317 While plaintiffs will concentrate on different facets of
the government’s awareness, what follows is a broad summary
intended to benefit a wide variety of plaintiffs who might seek to
bring inverse condemnation claims.
The United States has long addressed the pressure to act on
climate change by simply funding more research.318 One might view
this either cynically or charitably,319 but there is no serious debate as
to what the research has showed: anthropogenic climate change
exists.320 After scientists began tracking atmospheric CO2 in the late
316

E.g., major environmental legislation in the 1970s, international treaties between 1992 and
2016, and Executive Orders and regulations and their subsequent revocation. To limit
redundancy, this section simply directs the reader to supra Part IV and infra Section VII.C.
317
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511–12 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
318
See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 7, at 24.
319
Cynically, one may think of the anecdote of President Bush’s OIRA farce. See REVESZ,
supra note 112. Charitably, one may think that continuing sponsored research might “help
institutionalize [sic] attention to the problem within government.” See BAILEY, supra note 7,
at 24.
320
See, e.g., PHILPOTT, supra note 210, at 8–20 (using only documents obtainable from the
EPA or the U.S. Global Change Research Program and listing as measurable climate effects:
precipitation increase, heavy downpour increase, more frequent extreme weather events,
increase in hurricane activity, more uncertain storms, sea level rise, melting ice, and ocean
acidification).
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1950s, by 1965 that data was sufficient for President Johnson’s
Science Advisory Committee to report that CO2 levels were rising and
warming the earth. While scientists and politicians had little idea what
would come next,321 the Science Advisory Committee noted that by
2020, increases in CO2 “may be sufficient to produce measurable and
perhaps marked changes in climate . . . deleterious . . . [to] human
beings.”322
In the 1970s, Congress passed major environmental laws, but
they focused on local pollution rather than GHGs. Congressional
hearings on global warming continued.323 A 1977 report by the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS)324 called for action, though, in
the face of uncertainty, before it was too late.325 Perhaps in response,
Congress created a National Climate Program Office to “coordinate
climate-related research among a wide variety of . . . government
entities, including EPA, NASA . . . and the Departments of
Agriculture, Energy, and State.”326
Climate change research, rather than action, defined the
1980s, too, but the research became increasingly concerning. In 1984,
for example, a DOE-sponsored report explained that burning fossil
fuels was responsible for the rise of atmospheric CO2 from 1860 to
1982.327 And in 1988, NASA scientist James Hansen testified before
a Senate Committee “that he was 99 percent certain ‘the greenhouse
effect has been detected and it is changing our climate now.’”328
The 1990s marked the beginning of the international climate
change movement and also the United States’ intransigence in the
face of that movement. In the United States, research continued. In
321

REVESZ, supra note 77, at 115–16 (noting that the House Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development was still in the early stages of fact gathering).
322
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 49.
323
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 118.
324
See 36 U.S.C. § 150303 (2012) (created by Congress in 1863 in order to “investigate,
examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art”).
325
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 118.
326
Id. at 118–19 (describing creation of National Climate Program Act of 1978, supra note
83).
327
See CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. CTR., CDIC NUMERIC DATA COLLECTION (1984).
328
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 119; see also BREWER, supra note 4, at 150 (recalling that the
Committee was the Senate Energy and National Resources Committee).
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1990, Congress established the United States Global Change
Research Program (USGCRP), a group of thirteen federal agencies
and Departments, to “assist the Nation and the world to understand,
assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes
of global change.”329 Still—despite increasing international
consensus and Vice President Gore—all the government could
muster were “an assortment of small programs, most of them
voluntary and focused on energy conservation” that left
environmental groups “underwhelmed.”330
In the 2000s, climate change consensus became mainstream,
but the federal government remained unwilling to address it. Many
believed that climate change had played a role in Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, thus bringing the issue further into the public’s eye.331 The
NAS had also cautioned in 2005 that “the scientific understanding of
climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking
prompt actions.”332 In 2006, over two dozen massive companies—
“including utilities and oil companies”333—and national
environmental groups joined in the United States Climate Action
Partnership (USCAP)334 and pledged “to work with the President, the
Congress, and all other stakeholders to enact an environmentally
effective, economically sustainable, and fair climate change program
consistent with our principles at the earliest practicable date.”335
Recall also that in Massachusetts in 2007, the Court acknowledged
the reality of anthropogenic climate change,336 and the EPA
strenuously argued before the Court that the government had been
329

About USGCRP, GLOBALCHANGE.GOV, https://www.globalchange.gov/about (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018) (quoting from the Global Change Research Act of 1990).
330
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120.
331
See, e.g., New Hurricane Study Whips Up Warming Debate, NBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9356205/ns/us_news-environment/t/new-hurricane-studywhips-warming-debate/#.WnnTrZM-c1g.
332
U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P’SHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION 2 (2007) (quoting the NAS report)
(hereinafter “USCAP REPORT”).
333
REVESZ, supra note 77, at 127.
334
See United States Climate Action Partnership, MERIDIAN INST.,
http://www.merid.org/en/Content/Projects/United_States_Climate_Action_Partnership.aspx
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
335
USCAP REPORT, supra note 332, at 11.
336
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–23.
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well aware of climate change and its dangers by, at the latest, 1990.337
Since 2007, the United States government’s understanding of
anthropogenic climate change’s causes and likely effects has only
grown stronger. In 2009, USCAP released a “Blueprint for
Legislative Action,” which detailed these organizations’ preferences
for a carbon cap-and-trade bill.338 Also in 2009, the USGCRP
published a report that proclaimed: “[W]arming of the climate is
unequivocal” and “due primarily to human-induced emissions of
heat-trapping gases.”339 The report also explained that climate change
effects—including increased risk of flooding in coastal areas due to
sea-level rise and storm surge—were already observable in the United
States.340 NGOs continued calling on the government to take
action.341 Meanwhile, the Obama Administration was issuing a
groundbreaking rule regarding the auto industry that amounted to “the
first binding federal regulation of GHGs in U.S. history.”342 In 2012,
Hurricane Sandy again brought climate change into the national
political spotlight.343
Even more recent governmental reports drive home the point
more forcefully. In 2014, the USGCRP released a third national
climate assessment that stressed that “climate change, once
considered an issue for a distant future, has moved firmly into the
present.”344 In 2017, the USGCRP’s fourth national climate

337

Id. at 511–12.
See Jennifer Layke, The USCAP Blueprint for Legislative Action, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan.
15, 2009), http://www.wri.org/blog/2009/01/uscap-blueprint-legislative-action; REVESZ,
supra note 77, at 127.
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USGCRP REPORT, supra note 57, at 9.
340
See id. at 12.
341
See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, supra note 118, at 2 (“In this report, the authors
called for a National Adaptation Program and recommended new institutional mechanisms
and roles for federal agencies to mainstream the consideration of climate change across
agency operations, programs, and services.”).
342
Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car
Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 366 (2011).
343
See PEEL, supra note 31, at 145 (“[Sandy’s] severity and uncanny timing – just before the
2012 presidential election, in which climate change had not featured as an issue up to that
point – catapulted climate change and adaptation issues to front-page news.”).
344
Id. at 110.
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assessment spoke even more urgently.345 The report explained that
the “incidence of daily tidal flooding is accelerating in more than 25
Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities,”346 and that the “incidence of large
forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased
since the early 1980s and is projected to further increase.”347 The
previous year, the EPA had released an equally forceful report.348
These reports are only the highlights: many more studies prove the
United States’ awareness of anthropogenic climate change.
International developments—both those in which the United
States has played a part and those in which it has not—also put the lie
to any argument that plaintiff’s harm in the three successful scenarios
supra was not foreseeable. While the United States has not committed
itself to a binding carbon emissions treaty,349 it has joined numerous
international agreements and treaties as a signatory and participated
in global conferences on climate change.
The international community began to take climate change
seriously in the late 1970s. In 1979, the World Meteorological
Organization and the United Nations Environmental Program
together inaugurated the World Climate Program, which established
a yearly meeting to discuss climate research and to publicize
findings.350 The United States was well aware of these meetings. In
fact, in 1987, the United States suggested that these groups “create a
345

See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT:
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (2017) (hereinafter “NCA4”); see also Lisa
Friedman & Glenn Thrush, U.S. Report Says Humans Cause Climate Change, Contradicting
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Trump
Officials,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/climate/us-climatereport.html?action=click&contentCollection=Climate&module=RelatedCoverage&region=
EndOfArticle&pgtype=article/ (reporting on the NCA4 report).
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NCA4, supra note 345, at 10; see also id. at 27 (“As sea levels have risen, the number of
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5 to 10-fold since the 1960s in several U.S. coastal cities (very high confidence) . . . . Tidal
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new panel to study the scientific issue surrounding climate
change.”351 As a result, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) was formed and issued its First Assessment Report in
1990.352
The United Nations General Assembly put its imprimatur on
climate change efforts by helping to organize a foundational climate
change meeting in Rio in the summer of 1992.353 There, 154 countries
(including the United States) signed the UNFCCC,354 which
contained only a voluntary pledge that countries stabilize their GHG
emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 (and so the United States had no
problem ratifying it before it came into “force” in 1994),355 and
allowed for annual meetings of the signatories. Released in 1995, the
IPCC’s Second Assessment Report356 proclaimed that anthropogenic
climate change was supported by the “balance of evidence”357 and
also forecasted—if the status quo remained—that by 2100
temperatures would rise 3.6ºF and global sea level would rise 50
centimeters.358
Perhaps spurred on by the IPCC’s Second Assessment
Report, the parties to the UNFCCC came together in Kyoto in 1997
to discuss reducing GHG emissions. The resulting Kyoto Protocol
provided country-specific GHG emissions targets. The United States
signed (with a hollow commitment to reduce GHG emissions seven
percent below 1990 levels by 2012), but it never agreed to be bound
by the Protocol.359 In fact, the Senate had made clear that it would not
agree to any treaty that treated developed and developing countries
unequally.360 By 2000, GHG emissions in the United States “were 14
351
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percent above 1990 levels.”361
Following the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report in 2001362
and its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007,363 international scientific
consensus was crystalizing and nearly uniform.364 Of course, the
United States was well aware of this consensus: The Obama
Administration was attempting to regulate based on it. And, in 2009,
at the G8 Summit in Italy and at the United Nations Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen, President Obama urged the world to
follow America’s lead in reducing GHG emissions.365 The IPCC’s
Fifth Assessment Report in 2014366 simply drove the point home:
“Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions . . . are extremely likely to
have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid20th century.”367 The Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 followed.368
Under the Agreement, signatories pledged to hold global warming to
under 3.6ºF, and the United States in particular “pledged to cut its
greenhouse gas emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by
2025.”369 President Trump, however, notified the United Nations that
the United States intends to withdraw from the Agreement at the
earliest possible date (late 2020), making the United States the only
361
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http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/us/politics/23obama.text.html
(the
Copenhagen
speech).
366
See IPCC 5TH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 5.
367
Id. at 4.
368
See supra note 129.
369
Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climateagreement.html?_r=0.
362
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country opposed to it.370
In sum, every case will present a different problem that courts
must investigate factually. But—at least with respect to harms caused
by flood due to sea level rise and storm surge or wildfires in especially
dry and hot areas—it will be difficult for the United States to claim
that certain (and common) harms were not foreseeable consequences
of the United States’ actions to promote GHG emissions and its
failure to adapt to those climate change effects.
D. Causation
Normally, causation is not difficult for a plaintiff to show in a
physical takings case. For example, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., it
was clear that Wisconsin had authorized construction of a dam and
that “by reason of the dam, the water of the lake was so raised as to
cause it to overflow all [plaintiff’s] land.”371 Similarly, in Ark. Game,
the ACE clearly caused the flooding at issue because it authorized the
dam releases that led to the flooding.372 And in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the cause of physical
invasion—a nonconsensual cable installation on a landlord’s
property—was also plain: New York City had passed a law
authorizing such installation.373
Because the question hardly comes up, the upshot is that there
is not “judicial consensus” regarding the causation connection in
takings cases.374 However, precedent suggests that the test seems to
mirror the test for causation in tort law: elements of both cause-in-fact
and proximate (or moral) cause both seem necessary.375 In the claims
370

See Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-parisagreement.html?_r=1.
371
80 U.S. at 177; but cf. Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 103 (2005) (explaining
that Pumpelly “contains one of the Supreme Court’s first important discussions of causation
in the takings context” in that it laid down the marker for using cause-in-fact as a test).
372
568 U.S. at 27–28.
373
458 U.S. 419, 421–23 (1982).
374
See Laitos, supra note 37, at 1183–85; Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 112–120 (presenting and
attempting to resolve some of the confusion).
375
See, e.g., Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 101–02 (noting that “takings jurisprudence continues to
rely on general tort concepts such as causation to evaluate liability” and that “[f]ederal courts
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advocated by this paper, the federal government was both a cause-infact and a proximate, moral cause of plaintiff’s harm.
1. Cause-in-fact
Without saying so explicitly, Supreme Court precedent makes
clear that factual causation is required to hold the government liable
for a taking. In most cases, this analysis is almost entirely elided
because it is not in dispute.376 In the factual situations contemplated
here, though, cause-in-fact is more complicated because climate
change effects, such as flooding by sea level rise and storm surge and
wildfire caused by drought and heat wave, are so complex. For a
plaintiff here to establish factual causation, she must show, first, by a
preponderance of the evidence that the underlying cause of plaintiff’s
harm was a climate change effect and, second, that the United States
government’s role in promoting climate change—in addition to a
particular government entity’s failure to adapt adequately to the
particular climate change effect at issue—indicates that the federal
government was a “substantial factor” of plaintiff’s harm.
a. Whether a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm was a climate change
effect
The inverse condemnation claims contemplated here are
necessarily premised on the idea that climate change is likely
responsible for plaintiff’s underlying harm—either a flood or a fire,
in the five scenarios supra. If the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm
were not a climate change effect,377 plaintiff might have recourse
against the government, but not through a takings claim.
Determining whether the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm
is more likely than not a climate change effect could be either easy or
have embraced this relationship between tort concepts of property and takings claims”).
376
See, e.g., Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 166; Cress, 243 U.S. at 318 (stating as a fact of the case
that the backwater flood at issue “result[ed] from the construction and maintenance by the
government of certain locks and dams”); Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (eliding a consideration of
causation because the only planes at issue were owned by the United States government).
377
See, e.g., Laitos, supra note 37, at 1206–07 (citing Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467
(1991), as an example of a case in which the Act of Nature exception was applied).

144

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

difficult. In the first successful scenario supra, based on flooding
from sea level rise, the inquiry would be easy. Recall that sea level
rise is the clearest and most easily observable climate change
effect.378 Thus, scientific consensus, common sense, and reasonable
inferences all align and indicate that it is more likely than not—
virtually certain, in fact—that the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm
is a climate change effect.
The storm surge and wildfire contemplated in the second and
third successful scenarios supra are slightly more difficult cases. But
the connection between plaintiff’s harm and climate change still
seems rather strong because in both cases scientists and climatologists
made governmental entities aware of the high likelihood of such a
storm surge or wildfire occurring. In the second scenario, particularly,
recent, recurring storm surges also indicated that sea level rise—
clearly a climate change effect—was at least partly to blame for those
harms.
In general, though, it is true that even when overall trends
suggest a connection between GHG levels and a climate change
effect,379 attributing particular, extreme weather events to
anthropogenic causes can be difficult.380 But, there are burgeoning
scientific and statistical methods that attempt to correlate such events
with their anthropogenic causes. In fact, attribution science is
growing, and it is perhaps the next frontier in climate change
research.381 One prominent form of event attribution is Probabilistic
See supra note 9 and accompanying text; NCA4, supra note 345, at 333 (“Global mean
sea level (GMSL) has risen by about 7–8 inches . . . since 1900 . . . (very high confidence) . .
. contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800
years (medium confidence).”)
379
See, e.g., NCA4 Highlights: Extreme Weather, GLOBALCHANGE.GOV RES.,
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/extreme-weather, (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018) (“Some extreme weather and climate events have increased in recent decades,
and new and stronger evidence confirms that some of these increases are related to human
activities.”).
380
See PEEL, supra note 31, at 145 (“Impacts from a single extreme weather event, such as
Superstorm Sandy, are the most complex to connect to climate change as a scientific matter.
Nonetheless, such events fit with the trend toward more extreme weather in North America
that can be linked to climate change.”).
381
NAT’L ACADS. SCIS. ENG’G & MED., ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2016) (hereinafter, “NAS ATTRIBUTION”) (noting that “the
past decade has seen a remarkable increase in interest and activity in the extreme event
378
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Event Attribution (PEA).382 PEA works by “simulating the [extreme
weather] event in today’s world, and then . . . remov[ing]
anthropogenic emissions from the climate model’s atmosphere, and
do[ing] the same experiment again.”383 Only recently—within the last
five years—has PEA become plausible because of the advance of
computing power.384 Because predicting and projecting extreme
weather events in the future might save hundreds of thousands of
lives, improving attribution techniques will likely receive even more
attention from scientists and mathematicians in the coming years.385
Courts should take PEA and other legitimate event attribution
sciences into account in deciding whether anthropogenic climate
change was the underlying cause of a particular plaintiff’s harm. This
determination will require courts to engage with facts, science, and
statistics, which might be thought to be outside their institutional
competency. But difficulty of cases is hardly a reason to deny
meritorious plaintiffs relief if they are otherwise entitled to it.
A word on the preponderance standard employed here.
Because courts do not evaluate causation in the takings context in the
systematic way that this paper proposes, there is hardly any explicit
attribution field,” and that interest is increasing even more in the past few years: “From 2012
to 2015, the number of research groups submitting studies to this issue has grown by more
than a factor of five.”); see id. at 1–3 (remarking that advances in this field may be due both
to the improved understanding of “the climate and weather mechanisms that produce extreme
events” and to “rapid progress . . . in the methods that are used for event attribution,” which
rely primarily on “the observational record to determine the change in probability or
magnitude of events” or on “model simulations to compare the manifestation of an event in a
world with human-caused climate change to that in a world without”); see id. at x (pointing
out that scientists already believe all of the triggering events in the three scenarios supra—
“[d]roughts, floods, and wildfires”—have “a large weather and climate signal”). For more on
extreme heat and drought, see id. at 90–99. For more on wildfires, see id. at 115. For more on
tropical cyclones (which can lead to storm surges), see id. at 107.
382
For a detailed summary of other types of event attribution in use today, see id. at 47–83.
383
Annie Sneed, Yes, Some Extreme Weather Can Be Blamed on Climate Change, SCI. AM.
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/yes-some-extreme-weather-canbe-blamed-on-climate-change/; see also FRIEDERIKE OTTO ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF
ATTRIBUTING EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO ASSESSING
LOSS AND DAMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS (explaining PEA).
384
See Sneed, supra note 383 (“The science really only came into existence within the last
five years . . . . Only in the 2000s did [PEA] become an option because of greater computing
power.”).
385
See, e.g., NAS ATTRIBUTION, supra note 381, at ix–x; see also Sneed, supra note 383.

146

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

guidance regarding standards of evidence. However, preponderance
of the evidence seems proper here. First, and most simply, this paper’s
claims should succeed only in situations in which plaintiff’s harm
likely is, in fact, due to climate change. Second, a standard lower than
preponderance would threaten a deluge of takings litigation because
climate change surely plays some role, however small, in nearly all
floods and fires. Finally, the standard for proximate cause—here,
clear and convincing evidence386—must be stricter than that for
cause-in-fact.
b. Whether the federal government’s affirmative role in
bringing about climate change—plus its specific actions
or inactions in adapting to a particular climate change
effect—amount to a “substantial factor” in causing
plaintiff’s harm
Tort law’s default approach to cause-in-fact is “but for”
causation, which counsels holding a defendant liable when plaintiff’s
“harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”387 In the context
of the first successful scenario supra, for example, the “but for” claim
would proceed as follows: but for the United States’ encouragement
of fossil fuel emitting industries in addition to FEMA’s failure to
update flood maps as required by law, plaintiff’s harm would not have
occurred because plaintiff would not have built a home where she did.
Under this standard, the United States would be liable in all
three successful scenarios supra. The first scenario was already
discussed, and the federal government would be liable for exactly the
same reasons in the second successful scenario based on storm surge.
In the third scenario, the government was the “but for” cause of
plaintiff’s harm because it did not complete the controlled burn and
mechanical thinning that would have prevented the wildfire.
Still, as courts have done in similar contexts, courts here
should slightly relax the “but for” standard and instead adopt a
386

I employ clear and convincing evidence as the standard for proximate cause because courts
seem to require some level of proof higher than a preponderance but lower than certainty, or
even beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to hold a defendant liable for a taking.
387
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (Am. Law Inst.
2010); cf. Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516 (1919) (applying the standard).
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“substantial factor” test, which is employed in tort law when there are
multiple sufficient causes of plaintiff’s harm and irreducible certainty
about what exactly caused plaintiff’s harm.388 In the takings context,
the Supreme Court previously has tacitly accepted the “substantial
factor” test as justification of factual causation.389 This approach
comports with courts’ approaches in similar instances of widespread,
complex harm.
In the three successful scenarios supra, the federal
government might argue that some other entity is the actual sufficient
cause of plaintiff’s harm.390 For example, the federal government
might argue that while the United States is responsible for 27 percent
of the world’s cumulative, anthropogenic GHG output, most of that
output was actually emitted by private parties (even if the government
incentivized their behavior).391 Or, the United States might argue that
while FEMA, for example, may not have redrawn flood maps, local
governments are the actual cause of plaintiff’s harm because of
irresponsible zoning decisions.
But the fact that other actors might also be liable via different
388

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (Am. Law Inst.
2010); Anderson v. Minneapolis, 146 Minn. 430 (1920) (applying the standard in the context
of a parcel being destroyed simultaneously by two separate fires).
389
See Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 109–10 (noting that in John Horstmann Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 138 (1921), plaintiffs in the trial court “essentially tracked the substantial factor test
of causation borrowed from torts,” and that the “Supreme Court acknowledged this finding”
and believed that cause-in-fact did exist); but see Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States,
132 Ct. Cl. 445 (1955) (finding no causal connection when “[t]he most that can be said is that
the discharge of the waters from the shaft into the lake was a contributing factor towards its
overflow, or the seepage into it . . . .”).
390
Note that tort law occasionally in these situations—particularly in diethylstilbestrol (DES)
cases in the 1980s—has imposed liability by using a burden-shifting theory of market share
liability. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1987). While these cases factually are perhaps the closest parallel to
the claims in this paper, I do not advocate them because of their novelty.
391
See, e.g., Jackson Court Condos. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir.
1989) (“There is no evidence to indicate that the city’s action was the sole cause of the
bankruptcy. This was a typical business failure, perhaps abetted somewhat by zoning.”);
Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that the presence of
other causal factors made the connection too attenuated to sustain a takings claim); Laitos,
supra note 37, at 1208 (noting that “defendants assert this . . . defense most frequent when
they are able to identify another government or private actor that is more responsible for the
plaintiff’s harm”).

148

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26

avenues for a particular plaintiff’s harm does not foreclose a
successful inverse condemnation claim if a plaintiff proves the
elements of the claim. Some courts, in fact, have held the government
liable despite multiple potential causes of a particular harm. In Saint
Bernard Par. Gov’t, for example, the government argued that it was
not the negligent construction and upkeep of the MR-GO that caused
the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina, but rather subsidence,
sea level rise, and land loss, which were all outside of the
government’s control. While the court acknowledged that subsidence,
sea level rise, and land loss certainly contributed to plaintiffs’ harms,
it held the government responsible because its conduct—irrespective
of other potential causes—established causation.392
Other areas of law, too, have slightly relaxed threshold
causation requirements in complex factual circumstances. For
example, in the context of the Fair Housing Act,393 a plaintiff may
make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment by “showing that
animus against the protected group was a significant factor in the”
defendant’s position.394 And in the context of nuisance claims, too, a
defendant may be liable when it has been a “substantial factor in
bringing about the alleged harm.”395 Finally, courts have relaxed
causation standards in the standing context: plaintiffs in Juliana v.
United States established standing based on the United States’ 27
percent contribution to global GHG emissions because that was a
“substantial share.”396
See Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 743 (holding that “the MR-GO had the
principal causal role in creating the environmental damage in St. Bernard Polder”) (emphasis
added).
393
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2012).
394
MHANY Mgmt, Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 606 (2d Cir. 2016); see also SINGER,
supra note 39, at 620–22.
395
Page Cty. Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 171, 182 (Iowa 1984)
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 834 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“When a person is only one of several persons
participating in carrying on an activity, his participation must be substantial before he can be
held liable for the harm resulting from it. This is true because to be a legal cause of harm a
person’s conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”) (emphasis added);
SINGER, supra note 39, at 106.
396
See Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1245; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–26 (employing
similar logic in holding that plaintiffs had satisfied the redressability prong of Article III’s
392
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Precedent in takings jurisprudence, tort law, and other areas
of law all suggest that in the context of a complex claim with multiple
potential causes—such as the claims this paper advocates—there is
good reason to use the “substantial factor” test to assess cause-in-fact.
Doing so would neither open the floodgates to the type of claim this
paper advocates nor blur the line between tort law and takings
jurisprudence any more than it already is.397 Proximate cause
considerations, too,398 will further limit the federal government’s
liability. On the other hand, not employing the “substantial factor”
test would result in shutting out some plaintiffs who might be
constitutionally guaranteed just compensation from the federal
government.
2. Proximate (moral) cause
Once a court has concluded that the United States is a causein-fact of plaintiff’s harm, the next consideration is proximate, or
moral, cause. In tort law, courts employ proximate cause to limit
defendants’ accountability among torts for which they are causes-infact.399 Often, an element of foreseeability is thought to be
required.400 While courts have not articulated a clear proximate cause
test in the takings realm, courts seem concerned mainly with ensuring
that the federal government be held responsible only for harms which
it either intended or could have foreseen, so that it is neither made an
insurer of last resort nor deterred from helpful action.
This paper proposes a test in line with precedent that ensures
the government will be held responsible only for harms which it
proximately caused. The government has proximately caused
standing requirement, even though “regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself
reverse global warming” because a “reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of
global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere”).
397
See, e.g., Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 101 (“[A]n encroachment on property that constitutes a
taking if committed by the government constitutes a tort if committed by a private party.”).
398
See infra Section VII.D.2.
399
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (explaining the concept
as follows: “An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made
the actor’s conduct tortious”).
400
See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (finding that defendant was
not liable to an entirely unforeseeable plaintiff).
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plaintiff’s harm when clear and convincing evidence suggests that the
government either knew or should have known that its actions to
combat plaintiff’s harm were inadequate or that its inactions would
pose a significant risk of serious harm that did, in fact, materialize.
3. Precedent suggests “known or should have known” test
While courts have not used the phrase explicitly, precedent
suggests that courts have been applying a “knew or should have
known” standard in order to assess whether the federal government
in a particular case has proximately caused plaintiff’s harm. When the
government acts with knowledge that its action will cause a physical
invasion of private property and that invasion makes the property
uninhabitable, this unequivocally constitutes a taking.401 But ensuing
cases have made clear that if the government should have known that
its action (or inaction) would cause a physical invasion on plaintiff’s
property, that also constitutes a taking. For example, in United States
v. Causby, the Supreme Court held the federal government liable for
a taking despite the government’s lack of actual knowledge regarding
the consequences of its actions. In Causby, frequent military flights at
a low altitude over plaintiff’s property made it impossible for plaintiff
to use his land for its reasonable, intended use as a chicken farm
because the frequent flights so scared plaintiff’s chickens that they
often flew into the walls of their coop and killed themselves.402
Plainly, the federal government did not know that its flights would
lead to such a result. Nevertheless, the court held the federal
government liable.
In Cotton Land Co. v. United States,403 too, actual knowledge
was lacking, but because the government should have known about
the significant risk of plaintiff’s harm materializing, the court held the
federal government liable. In Cotton Land, the government’s
construction and operation of Parker Dam inundated lands that would
not obviously have been flooded as a result of Parker Dam’s
construction. Still, the court found that this physical invasion
401

See supra Part II.
See 328 U.S. at 259.
403
109 Ct. Cl. 816 (1948).
402

2019]

151

amounted to a taking. While the government may not have actually
known that erecting Parker Dam would lead to the subsequent
flooding of plaintiff’s land, the court did not believe that actual
knowledge was necessary.404 Instead, the fact that the government
should have known its constructing Parker Dam would lead to
flooding on plaintiff’s property was sufficient to hold it liable for a
taking. The court explained: “If engineers had studied the question in
advance they would . . . have predicted what occurred” because the
“loss resulted naturally from the improvement.” 405
Similarly, in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, the Court of Federal
Claims found the federal government liable for a taking based on both
actual knowledge and what the government should have known. In
this case, the ACE both actually knew—from Corps reports, EPA
studies, and academic papers—and should have known the significant
risk of serious harm in not maintaining the MR-GO.406 And in Ark.
Game II407—on remand from the Supreme Court—the Federal
Circuit similarly found that when the ACE engaged in seasonal dam
releases that flooded an area downstream, the resulting physical
invasion was compensable as a taking even though the ACE did not
actually know whether downstream flooding would result from its
actions. The federal government was liable because the ACE would
have known—had they undertaken “a reasonable investigation . . .
prior to implementing the deviations”408—that such flooding would
result.
Finally, in Hansen v. United States, plaintiff sued the federal
government because the Forest Service had, in federal land adjacent
to plaintiff’s property, buried cans of ethylene dibromide (EDB) that
contaminated water under plaintiff’s property.409 Even though the
Forest Service did not actually know that EDB would contaminate
plaintiff’s groundwater, the court held that plaintiff need not show
specific knowledge to succeed in an inverse condemnation claim
404

See id. at 831–32.
Id. at 829.
406
Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 720–23.
407
736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
408
736 F.3d at 1364–73.
409
65 Fed. Cl. at 81.
405
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because the “plain meaning of the Takings Clause” did not require
specific knowledge.410
a. “Direct, natural, or probable result” test is not the law and
is better articulated by “known or should have known”
test
Some courts have attempted to distinguish torts from takings
based on whether “the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or
probable result” of governmental action “and not the incidental or
consequential injury inflicted by the action.”411 However, this
language simply exempts the government from liability for harms
improbable enough that the federal government should not have been
expected to know of them. The “known or should have known” test
better articulates this goal. In addition, the Court has implicitly
rejected the “directness” formulation.
Sanguinetti v. United States412 and Ridge Line, Inc. v. United
States are two cases most responsible for promulgating the
“directness” test, but a close examination of both cases reveals that
they actually align with the “known or should have known” test. In
Sanguinetti, the Court refused to hold the federal government liable
when a government-constructed canal failed to carry away flood
waters in a “flood of unprecedented severity” because “[i]t was not
shown that the overflow was the direct or necessary result of the
structure.”413 However, the following sentence reads: “nor that it was
within the contemplation of or reasonably to be anticipated by the
government.”414 This formulation mirrors exactly the “known or
should have known” test.
In Ridge Line, plaintiff attempted to hold the federal
government accountable for a taking when the Postal Service
constructed a facility on land that had previously served to absorb
storm runoff that, after the facility was built, instead flooded
410

Id.
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
412
264 U.S. 146 (1924).
413
Id. at 147, 149–50.
414
Id. at 150.
411
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plaintiff’s land.415 The Federal Circuit remanded and instructed the
Court of Federal Claims to determine whether “the asserted invasion
is the direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and
not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action.”416
The court went on, though, to instruct the lower court specifically to
determine whether the increased runoff was “the predictable result of
the government action.”417 “Predictable result” here echoes “should
have known.”
In addition, the Supreme Court in Ark. Game considered both
Sanguinetti and Ridge Line but did not adopt their directness test.
Rather, the Court cited Ridge Line to support the following
proposition: “relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the
invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized
government action.”418 The reference to foreseeability and eschewing
of the directness test appears to indicate that the “known or should
have known” test is closest to current takings jurisprudence.
b. Applied to the scenarios
In each of the three successful scenarios supra, the federal
government has proximately caused plaintiff’s harm because clear
and convincing evidence suggests that the government either knew or
should have known that its actions to combat plaintiff’s harm were
inadequate or that its inactions would pose a significant risk of serious
harm that did, in fact, materialize.
In the first successful scenario of flood by sea level rise on
coastal property, clear and convincing evidence suggests that FEMA
knew that its flood maps were outdated and so posed a significant risk
of serious harm because plaintiffs might detrimentally rely on them.
Even if FEMA did not actually know that its inaction would lead to
significant risk of serious harm, it should have known because under
42 U.S.C. 4101(e), FEMA must reassess its flood maps every five
years. In the second successful scenario, the theory of liability is
415

346 F.3d at 1350–51.
Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
417
Id. at 1356.
418
Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39.
416
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almost exactly the same.
In the third successful scenario of a wildfire spreading from
an overgrown forest and razing parcels in a poor, adjacent
neighborhood, clear and convincing evidence also suggests that one
of the federal entities responsible for firefights and forest
maintenance—say, the Forest Service—knew or should have known
that its inaction in not undertaking controlled burns and mechanical
thinning in the overgrown forest posed a significant risk of serious
harm. The Forest Service here would have had actual knowledge
because it had planned to undertake controlled burns and mechanical
thinning to address the overgrown forest’s danger, and scientists and
climatologists repeatedly told the Forest Service that its inaction was
dangerous.
In contrast, each of the two unsuccessful scenarios supra—if
it has not already failed elsewhere in the five-factor takings test that
this paper advocates—would fail here. In the first unsuccessful
scenario regarding a category four hurricane in Seattle, a court likely
would have dismissed the claim for lack of cause-in-fact because the
preponderance of the evidence suggests neither that the underlying
cause of plaintiff’s harm was due to climate change nor that the
government was a “substantial factor” in plaintiff’s harm. If the claim
were mistakenly not dismissed, a court would dismiss it here because
clear and convincing evidence does not suggest that FEMA knew or
should have known that its inaction would lead to significant risk of
serious harm. The government did not know that a hurricane would
strike Seattle, and it should not have known, for even scientists and
climatologists did not anticipate it.
In the second unsuccessful scenario, recall that the federal
government—say, the Forest Service—attempted to address the
significant risk of serious harm from wildfire by undertaking
controlled burns and mechanical thinning in the overgrown forest at
issue, but still a wildfire occurred the following year. Here, the
government would not be liable because while the government knew
that there had been significant risk of serious harm by wildfire, the
government took action to ameliorate that significant risk. The
government should not have known of residual, significant risk of
serious harm stemming from that recently treated forest.
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The proximate cause test articulated here protects against a
“deluge of takings liability.”419 While the slippery slope argument
lacks merit anyway if the inverse condemnation claim is
meritorious,420 there will always be opportunistic or unfortunate
plaintiffs whose claims will not rise to the level of a taking. This
paper’s proximate cause test and substantiality requirements, see infra
Part VII.E, appropriately separate meritorious claims from
opportunistic ones to avoid making the government an insurer of last
resort for natural disasters.
c. Substantiality
While articulated differently in different cases,421 the point of
the final requirement is that the “[s]everity of the interference figures
in the calculus as well.”422 The three successful scenarios supra will
all surely soar easily over this final hurdle because in each of the
scenarios the land invaded by either water or fire is uninhabitable. The
substantiality prong (along with the proximate cause test) will ensure
that only meritorious inverse condemnation claims succeed.
Consideration of the substantiality of plaintiff’s harm overlaps with
the consideration of “significant risk of serious harm” in the
proximate cause test that this paper advocates supra.

419

Id. at 37.
See id. at 36 (noting that “[t]he slippery slope argument . . . is hardly novel or unique to
flooding cases”); cf. Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1262 (“A deep resistance to change runs
through defendants’ . . . arguments for dismissal: they contend a decision recognizing
plaintiffs’ standing to sue, deeming the controversy justiciable, and recognizing a federal
public trust and a fundamental right to climate system capable of sustaining human life would
be unprecedented, as though that alone requires its dismissal. This lawsuit may be
groundbreaking, but that fact does not alter the legal standards governing the motions to
dismiss. Indeed, the seriousness of plaintiffs’ allegations underscores how vitally important
it is for this Court to apply those standards carefully and correctly.”).
421
E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (articulating substantiality as “the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant”); Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356 (requiring that the
invasion “preempt the owner[’]s right to enjoy his property for an extended period of time
rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces its value”).
422
Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39.
420
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VI. CONCLUSION
Today, the world is hotter than ever before and concomitant
climate effects—such as sea level rise, ocean surface temperature rise,
increased regional incidence of drought, and heat wave—affect
people’s property directly through physical invasions such as floods
and fires. Some owners whose property is physically invaded in such
a way should have recourse against the United States government—
the most culpable GHG emitter in the entire world—through the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For over a century, the
United States government encouraged the fossil fuel industry to burn
extraordinary amounts oil, coal, and natural gas. Even though under
numerous constitutional and statutory duties to prevent physical
invasions of private property, the federal government has failed (and
will surely continue to fail) to adapt to climate change effects in
certain instances. Courts can use the five-factor test laid out by this
paper—and the three successful and two unsuccessful scenarios as
illustrations—to determine whether a particular plaintiff’s claim
against the federal government in this context should succeed. While
the government should not be the insurer of last resort for every
natural disaster, it should be liable for just compensation when it has
caused—through both its actions in promoting climate change and
failing to adapt to particular climate change effects—a physical
invasion of plaintiff’s private property.

